Generating a secure paper and pencil one time pad is very easy on a computer and can be expected to be completely secure if used properly. Of course, distributing, coordinating, and updating the pads is a weakness of such a system.
In the electronic era, messages can still be encrypted with digital one-time pads and this was the case years ago when the secure “hot-line” between the Soviet Leadership and the US president used such a system to communicate. (The hot line wasn’t a phone but a teletype.) This was a perfect use case, a single pair of end points resulting in an unbreakable use of the digital one time pad.
The biggest problem is that no matter what, the OTP ends up being some sort of physical medium that requires shipping to the end user. But really it's a scaled up version of the key distribution problem.
That problem has already been solved and the websites you visit today (should!) be working the same way:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy
> the key distribution problem
That is the hardest problem, especially in a system where you've got military units in unfriendly areas.
One time pads are useful for espionage, and you can see examples of how they are used here[1]. They took advantage of how most espionage worked (and who knows, may still work!): different channels for sending and receiving. The numbers station read you a short message, and if you needed to send a message back you signaled your handler to meet in person at a prearranged place.
The same thing that makes OTPs suck on ships make them excellent for sending short messages to spies. You can't hide an Enigma in a walnut, after all!
[1]: https://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/otp/index.htm