Collision attacks are an issue when using md5/sha1, but I don't see how it's relevant in this case. If state actors wants to replace the signal apk with a backdoored one, they'll need to pull off a preimage attack, not a collision attack. A collision attack wouldn't be useful because you still need the original publisher to sign the apk for you, which seems unlikely considering OWS isn't a CA or anything. If OWS was compromised by state actors into signing, then they can just sign the backdoored version directly, no need for a collision attack.
The vast majority of non-technical users have no knowledge about hexadecimal file comparisons or checksums. They see an app that promises privacy, and they click download.
As for hash collisions, as far as we know SHA256 hasn't been broken yet and even if it were broken you would need to be able to create a valid APK with Signal's code and the backdoor which hashes to the same thing as Signal.
Or you can just run Signal Desktop exclusively without the hassle of smartphones[0]. Audio / video calls recently landed in Signal Desktop too[1].
[0]: https://ctrl.alt.coop/en/post/signal-without-a-smartphone/
Don’t worry though; the Signal devs assure you that signed Android binaries from their website are reproducible [4]. As if checksum collisions aren’t something that state actors could trivially create [5].
I don’t trust Signal.
[1] https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/wiki/F-Droid
[2] https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcri...
[3] https://apps.apple.com/us/app/signal-private-messenger/id874...
[4] https://signal.org/blog/reproducible-android/
[5] https://shattered.io/