When organizations rely on hundreds to thousands of platforms to operate, and those platforms are under the weight of hundreds and thousands of dependencies, it's not unlikely one could discover and quickly take advantage of randomly sprinkled secrets in some github repository. Humans, weak passwords, and improperly configured ACL are often the common denominator in the majority of recent breaches, not the systems themselves. People get lazy and start overlooking well established protocols that could have prevented these attacks. It's hard to do this right unless you hire red teams to perform monthly audits of every possible leakage or attack vector.
The objective evaluation of a comprehensive security architecture depends on its holistic effectiveness, not merely the effectiveness of the parts the designers thought about. By that metric, I am not aware of any commercial IT system that even meets the low bar of protecting against an attack with a mere $10M in funding, let alone the billions a state actor has access to. So, a question for you, are you aware of any commercial IT system in the entire world that you think would survive a $10M open bounty let alone $1B? If so, what objective, empirical evidence do you have to justify that claim? Hopefully one day I might get a convincing response to this question.
Even if we restrict ourselves to only consider the magic bank vault, it is still unreasonable to completely ignore everything else. It is a common problem for systems to be so hard to use or configure that it is nearly impossible to effectively use them. It would be like the magic bank vault requiring you to leave the keys unprotected on the ground at which point it would be unreasonable to claim the magic bank vault is a secure component since it can only be effectively integrated in an insecure fashion. Any claim that it was, in fact, integrated securely would need to positively demonstrate this fact against the common expectation of insecure integration.
Frankly, this is also getting very unrealistic. If any company had a system with even 10x that number of critical, trivial flaws I would be amazed. From my experience there are hundreds to thousands of such flaws which run through components at every level of design. Any system with hundreds of stupid flaws across hundreds of different components each of which can cause critical compromise is so poorly designed as to be anti-redundant and also hopelessly insecure. It is not even worth it to quibble over factors of 10 as by my reckoning these systems must improve by a factor of 1,000 to pose any real obstacle to a dedicated state actor unless somebody can actually point to a system that can withstand a $10M open prize with meaningful verifiable evidence for that claim.