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Re:Sequoia PGP 1.0 Released: The Seedling Is a Sapling by Avamander on Thursday December 17, 2020 @06:23AM (#25454567)
Interesting, cool to see someone building a similar service to Keybase's account proofs. Hopefully they'll also build something like Keybase's proof integration https://book.keybase.io/guides/proof-integration-guide as well.

If you have any suggestions as to which E2E (group) messaging+fileshare+git platform I could use as a replacement for Keybase I'm all ears.

Re:Sequoia PGP 1.0 Released: The Seedling Is a Sapling by Boulth6 on Thursday December 17, 2020 @02:34PM (#25459394)
> Hopefully they'll also build something like Keybase's proof integration https://book.keybase.io/guides/proof-integration-guide as well.

As far as I've seen the proof integration is used only for Mastodon insurances and Keyoxide supports all of them by default: no need to ask for permission, no weird conditions to enter like, instance has to be bigger than N people.

I see this as a way to control who gets into Keybase. A perfect example of centralized control. The idea of programmable proofs looks good though.

> If you have any suggestions as to which E2E (group) messaging+fileshare+git platform I could use as a replacement for Keybase I'm all ears.

Sadly I won't help you with that. There are a number of services that want to eat Keybase's cake now but neither of them hits all points on my scale. So I'm using mostly several different services to get a semblance of the Keybase experience.

Re:Sequoia PGP 1.0 Released: The Seedling Is a Sapling by Avamander on Friday December 18, 2020 @04:41AM (#25465462)
> As far as I've seen the proof integration is used only for Mastodon insurances

Just Mastodon a very narrow view of what could be implemented though. I saw alpha implementation for Discourse as well, before Zoom acquired them.

> no need to ask for permission, no weird conditions to enter like, instance has to be bigger than N people.

Yep that sounds reasonable, as long as we're not going to end up with a DoS because of too many proofs.