People that fix ordinary bugs then also end up fixing many security bugs that are not classified as such. These are the unsung "heroes".
I think his point is that the important part is working on fixing bugs, and not making a show out of finding security ones.
So in my opinion he's right: both are equally important, as you cannot judge of the importance of each one on purely speculative and gross domain grounds. A potential is just that: a potential, until it gets real. Both cases can be mitigated or prevented by applying similar strategies (redundancy, layered checks, ...).
On the other side of the spectrum, a good bunch of Intel video cards have been crashing randomly (ranging from seconds to hours) since years and it affects a good deal of people which have to revert to vesafb or fbdev, or dismiss Linux entirely, right now. Another one is the issue introduced at some point that makes kworker eats up a chunk of CPU for no apparent reason (from 10% to 100%), resulting in useless wakeups and processing, raising power use by 1 to 10W. Multiply that by the growing number of Linux systems using 2.6.35+ and you get quite a bunch of watts that should have never been produced by power plants nor paid to energy companies by the machine owners. It happens right now with real, tangible effects.
I'm not dismissing security bugs, but put things into perspective as things are not black or white, and every single bug matters.
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/7/15/498
He simply doesn't want to make it easier for "exploitz searchers" to recognize which bug patches are "easy to make an exploit."
There is no point in telling him he's wrong, either. He'll just call you a "masturbating monkey".
Because that is what is being discussed here.
Is this really anything more than yet another opportunity for message board geeks to go "RARRR!"?
What is silly? Really, I have no clue as to what you are trying to say.
The fact is, despite that one obvious nit with his comment, if you take what he's saying in context, he has a very valid point about how the security community interacts with the Linux development community.
If a server with credit card information permanently corrupts the filesystem, and bricks all the hardware, and more or less does the worst that a non-security related software failure can do, the server gets reimaged or replaced. It costs maybe a few thousand dollars to replace. Nobody is really affected because failures are expected.
If a server with credit card information has a security bug, then credit card fraud and it's associated costs have to be dealt with, identities might have been stolen, and in general, large numbers of people are affected, possibly severely.