Sorry yes I sort of glossed over this part and some other parts in my explanation.
> If the locked state without a derived key loaded is as secure as it theoretically should be, doesn’t that mean recovering data off the device without uncapping (or similar) requires correctly guessing the passcode in however many master key derivation attempts the secure enclave is configured to allow before it wipes the secret key and renders the stored data useless?
You are correct. As pointed out below, this also assumes there is no vulnerability in the enclave. Having a secure passphrase with a secure key derivation function provides a more secure foundation however, because even having unlimited guesses means you are still down to the original brute force.
If the locked state without a derived key loaded is as secure as it theoretically should be, doesn’t that mean recovering data off the device without uncapping (or similar) requires correctly guessing the passcode in however many master key derivation attempts the secure enclave is configured to allow before it wipes the secret key and renders the stored data useless?
This seems really secure on average, even with a weak PIN. I’m trying to decode Cellebrite’s claims about access to “locked” phones and I’m assuming they mean locked with key loaded, though I guess I can imagine some vulnerability that sidesteps the maximum attempts logic in the secure enclave.