Still, once they have this function, all it takes is a court order to start collecting for other mailboxes.
Tutanota will take this to the next higher court but as it says in the article, they have to start implementing the backdoor right away.
Arguments can be had about the relevance of that distinction, but relevant or not, the distinction does exist. Thanks for clarifying!
(I'm not participating in the "Is this distinction relevant?" discussion today, sorry, just trying to understand what was passed. See other threads for pro/con arguments.)
My understanding of the German wiretapping law is also that they can only record messages from the point of the wiretapping court order so no older messages can be accessed by it.
This should not change anything for the other users, their mails should continue to be encrypted by default. Nevertheless, Tutanota considers a one-time circumvention of the encryption to be a data protection and security risk for all customers.
[Update, 30.11., 12 o'clock] As Tutanota emphasized, the monitoring measure only affects newly incoming unencrypted e-mails. Already encrypted data as well as end-to-end encrypted e-mails in Tutanota cannot be decrypted by the company. [Update]
> This is about a blackmail that had been sent to an automotive supplier from a Tutanota mailbox. Tutanota is now forced to program a function by the end of the year that allows the State Criminal Police Office of North Rhine-Westphalia to monitor this mailbox.
Lacking the ability to read this without translation, I cannot determine conclusively whether or not they're also required to preemptively retain plaintext emails for other mailboxes in order to support any future wiretapping requests.