Re:macOS has checked app signatures online for over 2 years
by danShumway on Wednesday November 25, 2020 @01:58PM
(#25212882)
I think you might be confusing accuracy and reliability. But I'm not here to argue about semantics, you can use whatever definition of accuracy you want. IP addresses are large attack vector for deanonymization/tracking, and people should be thinking more about how IP addresses get leaked and in what contexts. Whatever definition of "accuracy" you want to use, I don't think that changes the overall point that IP addresses matter.
To your earlier comment:
> Why would you not interpret this charitably as them not actually trying to spy on you?
I fully agree with this. I think Apple's intention is not to spy on users, it's to A) stop malware, and B) exert more control over their ecosystem in general.
I have a problem with point B, but that's a separate conversation.
To your later point:
> It is not possible to accurately connect an identity with an IP address.
This is just plain wrong; it is possible to accurately connect identities to IP addresses, people do it all the time. Reliability is a separate conversation. If you're working off of a different definition of "accurate", then, whatever, I don't care. But I stand by the point that IP addresses are a privacy risk and that they can be used to track/identify users in the real world, I don't think that's a disputable fact.
The privacy worry here is twofold. First that these requests are (currently) sent in plaintext. To their credit, I think Apple is fixing that issue. Which is good, because plaintext payloads allow adversaries on the same network to potentially sniff which applications you're using.
The second privacy worry is that regardless of whether or not Apple is trying to spy on users, they still might be storing that data, and we only have their word to go on that it'll be stored in a protected way or deleted regularly. If a court order comes down asking Apple to reveal that information, or if it gets hacked, that data increases the threat model for Apple users.
An adversary with access to Apple's data (whether that adversary is a hacker or a government) could theoretically tie app usage to real-world identities if the IP addresses are logged, especially if they can match IP addresses with logging of other data being sent to Apple's servers. That's the point m463 is making in his original comment -- the data here doesn't just exist in isolation, it's IP addresses that an attacker could correlate with other real-world identifying information.
To your earlier comment:
> Why would you not interpret this charitably as them not actually trying to spy on you?
I fully agree with this. I think Apple's intention is not to spy on users, it's to A) stop malware, and B) exert more control over their ecosystem in general.
I have a problem with point B, but that's a separate conversation.
To your later point:
> It is not possible to accurately connect an identity with an IP address.
This is just plain wrong; it is possible to accurately connect identities to IP addresses, people do it all the time. Reliability is a separate conversation. If you're working off of a different definition of "accurate", then, whatever, I don't care. But I stand by the point that IP addresses are a privacy risk and that they can be used to track/identify users in the real world, I don't think that's a disputable fact.
The privacy worry here is twofold. First that these requests are (currently) sent in plaintext. To their credit, I think Apple is fixing that issue. Which is good, because plaintext payloads allow adversaries on the same network to potentially sniff which applications you're using.
The second privacy worry is that regardless of whether or not Apple is trying to spy on users, they still might be storing that data, and we only have their word to go on that it'll be stored in a protected way or deleted regularly. If a court order comes down asking Apple to reveal that information, or if it gets hacked, that data increases the threat model for Apple users.
An adversary with access to Apple's data (whether that adversary is a hacker or a government) could theoretically tie app usage to real-world identities if the IP addresses are logged, especially if they can match IP addresses with logging of other data being sent to Apple's servers. That's the point m463 is making in his original comment -- the data here doesn't just exist in isolation, it's IP addresses that an attacker could correlate with other real-world identifying information.