EDIT: I should point out that, in practice, somebody from the originating organization inevitably confirms the authenticity of the leaked documents through contacts with more traditional journalists. But what would happen if a set of documents were leaked and nobody was able to confirm them?
Alternately, what if a set of documents really are forged, but it's an inside job? The same person or persons who "leak" the document to wikileaks could then "verify" it to journalists "on condition of anonymity." The journalists would know that their sources are from the appropriate organization, but nobody would have all of the information necessary to connect the dots that the leaker and the verifier are the same person or group. I could definitely see this being used as part of a corporate power struggle (make a rival look bad, get him fired; or do the same to your boss) or a political struggle in government (use politically sympathetic career bureaucrats to generate a scandal for an incumbent six weeks before election day).
If what you're leaking is so secret that you can't even discuss it with them in advance, then you shouldn't trust them period. It's on you as the leaker to make sure they have no way to determine your identity in the first place.
Basically, it appears you're arguing for the case that the WSJ is a great place to send your leaks if you already know there won't be repercussions (via your own precautions or their flaccid protections), which is pretty much what they have now. What's the difference between this and a link to "[email protected]"?
It's different from emailing [email protected] because there's an explicit promise to minimize identifiable information and to limit access to messages. It's also tough to send large files by email.
So, if you already want to leak things to the WSJ, that mechanism already existed. If anything this is probably just Rupert being butthurt over his loss of control over the mass-media news landscape and "me too!"'ing on WL. Nice try, old man.
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