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Re:Cover Your Tracks by Wowfunhappy on Friday November 20, 2020 @08:27PM (#25167142)
I've been thinking for a while—what if the solution to fingerprinting wasn't making your browser less unique, but less constant?

Take Canvas fingerprints. If you added a bit of randomness to how the browser renders pixels, the fingerprint would change each time you measured it. It would still be unique, but it would be a useless tracking tool.

Presumably I'm not the first person to come up with this, is there a reason it isn't done?

Re:Cover Your Tracks by antonok on Friday November 20, 2020 @08:51PM (#25167264)
This is actually exactly what Brave does! Both for Canvas and WebAudio, which is also used for fingerprinting in a similar way.

There's more info here if you're curious: https://brave.com/privacy-updates-4/

Re:Cover Your Tracks by igravious on Saturday November 21, 2020 @12:00PM (#25170822)
But won't trackers start ignoring these cues?

Here is Brave's take: https://brave.com/brave-fingerprinting-and-privacy-budgets/

Re:Cover Your Tracks by gitgud on Saturday November 21, 2020 @02:29AM (#25168343)
This is very similar to how OS's and Browsers have mitigated the spectre vulnerabilities last year.

They basically fuzz (randomize) the timing precision that you can do, so you can't use timing to leak information across 2 different processes.

>"As of Firefox 57.0.4, Mozilla was reducing the resolution of JavaScript timers to help prevent timing attacks, with additional work on time-fuzzing techniques planned for future releases."

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerabil...

Maybe similar tactics could help prevent finger-printing!

Re:Cover Your Tracks by surround on Friday November 20, 2020 @09:13PM (#25167367)
Randomizing fingerprints is generally a bad idea. See:

https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/4.1-Extensions#smal...

Re:Cover Your Tracks by Wowfunhappy on Friday November 20, 2020 @09:31PM (#25167465)
Sorry, I don't actually see in there why randomizing something like a canvas or webaudio fingerprint is a bad idea. I believe they know what they're talking about, but I'd still like to know why.

Notably, to me this isn't necessarily about beating the resistFingerprints setting, because I can't use that setting. For good or for ill, it breaks too much of the web.

Re:Cover Your Tracks by gruez on Friday November 20, 2020 @11:07PM (#25167807)
>Sorry, I don't actually see in there why randomizing something like a canvas or webaudio fingerprint is a bad idea

Literally the first bullet

>It is trivial to detect RFP and when you change a RFP metric, you lose your "herd immunity"

Re:Cover Your Tracks by Wowfunhappy on Friday November 20, 2020 @11:18PM (#25167847)
But that's referring to privacy.resistFingerprinting (RFP), not adding randomness. RFP isn't really an option, at least for me, because it breaks too many sites.
Re:Cover Your Tracks by gruez on Friday November 20, 2020 @11:27PM (#25167873)
>But that's referring to privacy.resistFingerprinting (RFP), not adding randomness

having a randomized fingerprint is a fingerprint value in and of itself. That may leak more entropy bits if you have a fairly common hardware configuration

Also, regarding webaudio fingerprinting, afaik it's not a real threat.

https://github.com/WebAudio/web-audio-api/pull/2224#discussi...

https://github.com/w3cping/tracking-issues/issues/53#issueco...

>As I said, I can't use RFP, it breaks too many sites.

Weird. I only know a few sites that break with RFP on, and I don't use them frequently.

Re:Cover Your Tracks by kunfuu on Saturday November 21, 2020 @01:46AM (#25168240)
This reasoning is valid when randomization is not pre-configured and is done at the individual level. It doesn't hold when talking about changes that come with browsers etc and deployed at scale.
Re:Cover Your Tracks by kdrag0n on Friday November 20, 2020 @08:54PM (#25167285)
Re:Cover Your Tracks by gtsop on Friday November 20, 2020 @08:52PM (#25167275)
This deserves to be heard. I will also add to this, since it is known we can use addons to disable tracking and fingerprinting but addons can themselves be used for fingerprinting, why don't we get a feature on firefox (or even one more addon) to prevent javascript from getting a true result when querying for known addons?
Re:Cover Your Tracks by gruez on Friday November 20, 2020 @11:03PM (#25167788)
>Take Canvas fingerprints. If you added a bit of randomness to how the browser renders pixels, the fingerprint would change each time you measured it. It would still be unique, but it would be a useless tracking tool.

that doesn't work because the sites can just take multiple samples and average the results.