Do you really think that the US Navy Seals don't bother to think "Hey maybe we should have a backup plan for this hugely important and very risky mission" unless the President comes up with the idea?
The linked article does smell a bit like the President trying to insert himself into the story.
Mr Burns: You, Strawberry, hit a home run!
Daryl Strawberry: Okay skip! (hits a home run)
Mr Burns: I told him to do that.
Smithers: Brilliant strategy, sir.
Look, neither of us can prove our claims, since we weren't there. But I have read several news reports along these lines, that Obama pushed for more redundancy.
One might ask: why didn't the SEALs think of it? The answer can be (and here again, this is pure speculation just like yours) that the SEALs wanted the smallest possible contingent, to avoid being detected (2 helis are less likely to be detected as 4) and risking the Pakistanis' ire. But at some level, diplomatic considerations creep in; and Obama could have said (or thought) "I'll take care of the fallout; but I want you guys to be double-extra safe".
While it is easy to dismiss this news report as you did, I don't think that is the case here.
For example: in the photograph released by the WH (where everyone is huddled, watching the monitor), Obama is in a corner, and the military guy is centre stage. Don't you think if Obama was so self-promoting as you claim he is, that he would have maneuvered into a better shot? Maybe placed himself front-and-center, to show he's "in command" ??
In comparison: do you remember how Bush flew a jet onto the carrier, "Mission Accomplished" ? That is self-promotion.
* Perhaps Obama had intelligence that the incursion might provoke a group of Pakistani military officers to defy their government's orders and launch an armed response, possibly because of the location of the strike, or possibly as a prelude to a coup. He wouldn't necessarily have shared that with the SEAL team, he would have just told them to be prepared to "fight their way out" if necessary.*
The operation was under the direct control of the CIA, and I think we can assume the CIA has just as much intelligence knowledge as the White House does.
And now personally, if I had reason to believe that men under my command were likely to be entering into actual hostile contact with the military of the sixth largest country in the world (and a nuclear power to boot) then I'd probably actually have shared that information with them. They're big boys, they can handle it, and if they see the Pakistani Army showing up then they need to know whether they're allowed to shoot.
When he (purportedly) said "fight your way out," who else could he have been talking about fighting? I think it's safe to assume they got a lot more specific than speculating about fighting undefined hypothetical resistance that might happen to materialize outside this compound in the middle of Pakistan.
If the president knew such critical information and didn't share it up-front with the operators planning the mission, that's a big fail on his part. Given the sensitivity of this operation, if he didn't trust the people involved with all of the critical information about the situation, he shouldn't have trusted them to execute the mission, either. I can see how he might not want to share the details about which generals were in league with who, but that doesn't preclude the pre-planning intel brief from including a warning that the Pakistani military might interfere with the operation. There is absolutely no excuse for the operators to not have such critical information before they start planning their mission, rather than "Oops, we forgot to mention..." after they have already built a plan.
In practice, high-level leaders often get much less resolution in their intel than those below them: they need to know the big picture, not necessarily all of the little details. I somehow doubt that the President was micromanaging the planning process and intel dissemination in this way. I think that a far more likely scenario is that two or more plans were developed and presented to the President and his national security team, with the strengths and weaknesses of each plan. For example:
Plan A: Minimum number of helicopters. Reduces our exposure and the chances of detection, but sharply limits our options for dealing with contingencies.
Plan B: Back-up helicopters loiter a few miles from the target area. Increases our footprint and the chances of detection, but gives us far better options for dealing with contingencies.
I could easily see how the reality was that the President said, "Let's go with plan B: I want you guys to have the backup if you need it," which then went through the "telephone game" and ended up being reported as "President Saves the Day by Reminding SEALs to Bring Spare Helicopter."
The SEALs don't need to know the political details. They just need a heads-up: "Hey guys, you need to be aware that because of the political situation in Pakistan, you might end up fighting the Pakistani military as well Bin Laden's personal security. Let me lay out the nature of the resistance you might face."
Those concerns could easily have been raised so late (ten days before the raid) because the President himself didn't have it earlier.
As for the idea that such information would be late-breaking, I find that to be incredibly implausible for the CIA's analysis of the mood of a nation's leadership to swing wildly in such a short amount of time.
Ultimately, I don't think that such a decision would have been based on a single element like, "The Pakistani military might interfere." I think that hugh3 had it right: there is no way that the SEALs wouldn't have built significant redundancy into their plan from the very beginning. His Simpsons analogy is spot-on: the President telling the SEALs how to plan a military mission is like a spectator telling a pro athlete how to make the next play.