Sysadmins dont pick their private key. They dont write the private key on a post it. None of the reasons for not doing password expiry apply here.
Primary benefit of shorter certificates is it probably makes it easier to punish CAs that dont follow the rules.
Isn’t it primarily free CAs like LE that are pushing for shorter expiration times?
IIRC the primary argument is not about security or safety, but rather that shorter certificate lifetimes encourage companies to automate certificate renewal/make it a regular part of their business routine. If you only have to renew a certificate every five years, then it’s really easy to forget.
The argument that gets presented to me is that shorter times reduce the risk of someone compromising the cert and pretending to be the real server. But that risk requires a pretty motivated attacker to also compromise DNS or server farm and that probably doesn’t matter because they will plan around any renewal cycle.
When you tell management "we need to automate this process that will happen every month", you will get approval.
It's not about the effort to automate the process, it's the opportunity cost of investing that effort.
I’d rather have 5 year certs and rely more on revocation than have this stupid exercise where people must renew every year or 13 months that just so happens to collect tons of rent seeking income from a few firms.
It’s kind of like how the shift to non-expiring passwords. We were trying to correct for the risk of a compromised password by making it harder to have secure passwords. I think we’re better off with having really strong passwords that only ever get changed when necessary and allowing this my monitoring login actions for weird stuff.