Yes, journalists verified it. But they consider it supporting data, just as they wouldn’t automatically ignore any email that had no DKIM signature.
Phone calls are never authenticated. Does anyone automatically believe or disbelieve recorded phone calls?
I mean, “conspiracy theorists” (in the common usage of that terms) already believe only what they want to believe.
I think the point boils down to expectation management: journalists (and ...) barely understand non-repudiation, much less why each of the following scenarios pans out:
* 2006 email + 512-bit RSA, leaked in 2006: probably authentic
* 2008 email + 512-bit RSA, leaked in 2012: potentially inauthentic
* 2008 email + 1024-bit RSA, leaked in 2008: probably authentic
* 2008 email + 1024-bit RSA, leaked in 2016: potentially inauthentic
...and so on. In sum: we're making life harder for the people doing real investigative work (since they're not technical), and we're giving fodder to the people who want to conspiracize. All because we're using a spam mitigation technique to provide properties that it was never intended to provide.
The wrong solution is to make previously private keys public to make any reasoning about past data impossible in the name of “hut journalists might get a wrong impression”
And yet, the deepfake equivalent to the suggested solution is one of "start showing deepfake as news" or "stop showing any video as news", neither of which anyone would consider a reasonable response to deepfakes. I just don't understand how DKIM is suddenly so revered as truth when almost no one knows what it is.
The point is that DKIM can be abused to lend undue credibility to falsified data... not that it can credibly attest true data.
These is absolutely no way you're going be able to educate the general public on the nuances of this. I mean, there are lots and lots of people who doubt the efficacy of vaccines and masks...
So can deep fakes. What makes deep fakes explainable and DKIM unexplainable?
If the journalists interests do not align about DKIM, how come they align about deepfakes?
I'm not saying journalists have any integrity. I'm just wondering why specifically for DKIM a "throw the baby out with the bathwater" solution is advocated, whereas for things like deep fake it isn't -- where the underlying truth is the same: "You can't trust what you see/hear".
Regardless, the fact that deep-fakes exist has absolutely no impact on whether DKIM has problems or not.
I have pointed out that in a similar case (potentially fake evidence), same actors (journalists) seem to have completely different incentives than those you hold so self-evident and I ask for an explanation of the difference - why is it so self evident that journalists have an incentive to not understand DKIM and not inform about it, but the same is not true of another concurrent challenge to evidence authenticity.
To me it sounds like you’re saying “journalists eat cotton candy because they like sweets, but they don’t like chocolate because they care about their teeth”. They might have this preference among cotton candy and chocolate, but the explanation is inconsistent and likely wrong.
Both journalists and investigative groups (and conspiracy theorists) treat DKIM as a sign of authenticity, even when the key material is long past its prime. Wikileaks still prominently displays a "verified" marker next to their archives.
> Did DKIM change anything about the podesta emails? Or were they basically acknowledged as authentic regardless, and had a lot of other verifyable info in them?
That's hard to say, but it's also not the point. The point with being able to crack the key is that a motivated party could intersperse false information with otherwise verifiable information. And, well, what's a conspiracy theorist to do? Only believe the non-juicy parts?