Apple knows this. They have cryptography experts.
Taken in context with their backdooring of their e2e messenger and collaboration with military intelligence on FISA 702, I tend not to give them the benefit of the doubt any longer. Apple knows how to take pcaps.
There are only so many times the OS design gets to leak either keys or plaintext remotely before you need to stop assuming ignorance over malice.
I don’t know how many times that is, but it’s less than ten, probably less than 5, and because it’s a count of legitimate “assume ignorance”, then “goto fail”[2] also counts in the tally.
Between this OCSP plaintext telemetry leak, and iMessage default key escrow, scrapping their plan for e2e backups at the behest of the FBI that fixes the key escrow backdoor[3], and “goto fail” not authenticating TLS, we’re at 4.
I’m not even counting the recent story about Apple’s history of willing collaboration with intelligence agencies to make a custom classified firmware for the iPod to aid in espionage.[1]
As Goldfinger’s famous saying goes: “Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. The third time it’s enemy action.”
[1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24212520
[2]: https://www.zdnet.com/article/apples-goto-fail-tells-us-noth...
[3]: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...
What would this ‘count’ as?
If there's a hit, a subsequent request can be sent to Apple to verify the same - reducing the impact.
According to Wikipedia "[OCSP stapling] allows the presenter of a certificate to bear the resource cost involved in providing Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses by appending ("stapling") a time-stamped OCSP response signed by the CA to the initial TLS handshake, eliminating the need for clients to contact the CA, with the aim of improving both security and performance."
I'm not aware how widely deployed OCSP stapling is in reality. I looked at my Firefox settings which seemed to be the default for OCSP and it looked like this:
security.OCSP.enabled 1
security.OCSP.require false
security.OCSP.timeoutMilliseconds.hard 10000
security.OCSP.timeoutMilliseconds.soft 2000
security.ssl.enable_ocsp_must_staple true
security.ssl.enable_ocsp_stapling true
So I assume OCSP stapling is enabled but direct OCSP is disabled in Firefox by default but a positive OCSP response is not required in general. I tried to check what was really happening with Wireshark but regardless of the configuration and sites I visited, I couldn't get Firefox to emit an OCSP query.I also don't know what other TLS implementations (like OpenSSL) do and how users of such libraries usually configure them.
Addendum: Oh and of course, OCSP stapling is useless when you weren't about to open a TLS connection (like in this case when checking software signing certificates). I'm also curious if and how this works for other applications of X.509 certificates such as mutual TLS authentication.
Wow, that is bad from a privacy perspective!
Since certificate revocation is rare, it makes more sense to simply periodically update a list of revoked certificates instead of repeatedly checking each certificate. That would solve the privacy issue while still allowing certificates to be revoked.
OCSP seems like a bad idea for web browsing for similar reasons.