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Re:Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look by musicale on Saturday November 14, 2020 @05:13PM (#25096156)
> You should be aware that macOS might transmit some opaque information about the developer certificate of the apps you run. This information is sent out in clear text on your network.

Wow, that is bad from a privacy perspective!

Since certificate revocation is rare, it makes more sense to simply periodically update a list of revoked certificates instead of repeatedly checking each certificate. That would solve the privacy issue while still allowing certificates to be revoked.

OCSP seems like a bad idea for web browsing for similar reasons.

Re:Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look by dabeeeenster on Saturday November 14, 2020 @05:28PM (#25096264)
I don't quite understand why anyone would send data in clear text anymore, let alone Apple.
Re:Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look by neurostimulant on Sunday November 15, 2020 @04:12AM (#25099555)
Maybe there is a bizzare reason why they don't use https on their ocsp endpoint. Perhaps they want to avoid situation where the ocsp server's certificate itself is revoked, or anticipated that the ocsp server would still be in use 10 years later where the currently used crypto could have been marked as insecure and removed and thus prevent older clients from working. Or it could be laziness, but come on...
Re:Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look by douglasdrumz on Saturday November 14, 2020 @06:24PM (#25096627)
It's explained in the article, there's a loop if you want to verify a certificate and you need the certificate to verify the certificate
Re:Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look by pedro2 on Saturday November 14, 2020 @06:43PM (#25096723)
Check server certificate OCSP first, send subsequent queries via SSL.
Re:Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look by lstamour on Saturday November 14, 2020 @07:00PM (#25096812)
Precisely. This would require more work, but it would only leak the OCSP server’s revocation request, and would make OCSP both more secure (caching OCSP server validity rather than the original certificates) and more private (due to SSL).
Re:Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look by sneak on Saturday November 14, 2020 @07:36PM (#25096990)
You can do unauthenticated TLS, which is no worse than plaintext HTTP, and foils passive listeners by providing privacy. You could also trust your existing trusted certs (prior to OCSP update) when doing the OCSP update, which, again, is no worse than plaintext HTTP.

Apple knows this. They have cryptography experts.

Taken in context with their backdooring of their e2e messenger and collaboration with military intelligence on FISA 702, I tend not to give them the benefit of the doubt any longer. Apple knows how to take pcaps.

There are only so many times the OS design gets to leak either keys or plaintext remotely before you need to stop assuming ignorance over malice.

I don’t know how many times that is, but it’s less than ten, probably less than 5, and because it’s a count of legitimate “assume ignorance”, then “goto fail”[2] also counts in the tally.

Between this OCSP plaintext telemetry leak, and iMessage default key escrow, scrapping their plan for e2e backups at the behest of the FBI that fixes the key escrow backdoor[3], and “goto fail” not authenticating TLS, we’re at 4.

I’m not even counting the recent story about Apple’s history of willing collaboration with intelligence agencies to make a custom classified firmware for the iPod to aid in espionage.[1]

As Goldfinger’s famous saying goes: “Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. The third time it’s enemy action.”

[1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24212520

[2]: https://www.zdnet.com/article/apples-goto-fail-tells-us-noth...

[3]: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...

Re:Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look by zepto on Saturday November 14, 2020 @09:10PM (#25097572)
“ I’m not even counting the recent story about Apple’s history of willing collaboration with intelligence agencies to make a custom classified firmware for the iPod to aid in espionage.”

What would this ‘count’ as?

Re:Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look by captn3m0 on Sunday November 15, 2020 @02:36AM (#25099107)
Has anyone tried a revocation list-over bloom filters? Similar to how Google's Safe Browsing filter works?

If there's a hit, a subsequent request can be sent to Apple to verify the same - reducing the impact.

Re:Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look by t0astbread on Sunday November 15, 2020 @11:00AM (#25102128)
I was initially shocked by this as well so I did some more reading on OCSP and it seems this is being addressed through OCSP stapling.

According to Wikipedia "[OCSP stapling] allows the presenter of a certificate to bear the resource cost involved in providing Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses by appending ("stapling") a time-stamped OCSP response signed by the CA to the initial TLS handshake, eliminating the need for clients to contact the CA, with the aim of improving both security and performance."

I'm not aware how widely deployed OCSP stapling is in reality. I looked at my Firefox settings which seemed to be the default for OCSP and it looked like this:

  security.OCSP.enabled                     1
  security.OCSP.require                     false
  security.OCSP.timeoutMilliseconds.hard    10000
  security.OCSP.timeoutMilliseconds.soft    2000
  security.ssl.enable_ocsp_must_staple      true
  security.ssl.enable_ocsp_stapling         true
So I assume OCSP stapling is enabled but direct OCSP is disabled in Firefox by default but a positive OCSP response is not required in general. I tried to check what was really happening with Wireshark but regardless of the configuration and sites I visited, I couldn't get Firefox to emit an OCSP query.

I also don't know what other TLS implementations (like OpenSSL) do and how users of such libraries usually configure them.

Addendum: Oh and of course, OCSP stapling is useless when you weren't about to open a TLS connection (like in this case when checking software signing certificates). I'm also curious if and how this works for other applications of X.509 certificates such as mutual TLS authentication.

Re:Does Apple really log every app you run? A technical look by catlifeonmars on Saturday November 14, 2020 @06:21PM (#25096617)
The SLA for being made aware of revocations should be configurable from the client side. OCSP here would be fine if (a) it was sent over an encrypted connection using a preinstalled Apple root CA, and (b) the user could set the the TTL for caching the response. Larger developers (with more resources) could also feasibly implement something similar to OCSP stapling which has several desirable properties.