Though actually note that the classic Mancur Olson result is "the exploitation of the strong by the weak". That is, the person who has the largest share of output contributes disproportionately much to the public good.

Simple proof: write individual i's marginal benefit from the company's total effort X as

s_i f(X) - x_i

where s_i is i's share of the output f(X), and x_i is i's own effort. Taking everyone else's effort as given, i will equate marginal benefit of own effort to marginal cost, so that total effort solves

s_i f'(X) = 1

equivalently

f'(X) = 1/s_i

Now suppose the person with the largest share satisfies the above. Then everyone with a smaller share must have

f'(X) < 1/s_i

and therefore, if they are contributing more than the minimum possible, they have an incentive to reduce their contribution. So, this extreme version has that only the largest "shareholder" does any work. (A more realistic model has a convex cost of effort, so smaller shareholders do something, but they still contribute less than their output share.)