A high school teacher of mine in the 1970s predicted an accident like AF447. He framed it this way: the 'American' approach is to implement FBW to always do what the pilot inputs indicate, whereas the 'French' approach is to do the right thing, and override the pilot if the FBW 'knows' better. That's an interesting cultural cultural consistency as well!
So, the 'American' approach is better if the sensors are not working as expected, and it makes the software simpler. The 'French' approach is better if the pilot is wrong, but both the sensors and the software must be working perfectly. Everyone makes mistakes, and all software has bugs. What to do?
(In reality, some 'judgement' is needed by the software, even in the American approach.)
EDIT: That said, some of the design choices in the Airbus FBW are baffling, such as making the control input the average of two different inputs. I like to think AF447 is less likely to have happened in a Boeing ship, although the ulitimate cause of the crash was a pilot making what amounts to a beginner mistake.
Don't miss William Langewiesche's article!
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-...
With the fbw system, the software makes the choice on how to interpret the control movement, use one or both? If one, which one?
EDIT: Maybe you mean that a mechanical linkage would provide a feedback mechanism, so that one pilot would know if the other pilot was attempting an input? I don't know if there's force feedback on Airbus flight controls.
In this case, the pilot would have realized the junior copilot was issuing control inputs and (likely) prevented a plane from crashing, saving the lives of all aboard.
Seems like a pretty decent point to me.
> EDIT: Maybe you mean that a mechanical linkage would provide a feedback mechanism, so that one pilot would know if the other pilot was attempting an input? I don't know if there's force feedback on Airbus flight controls.
Yes, that's what I meant. And no, there isn't. At least, not one that would indicate conflicting inputs from the other pilot.
But it was only one of the pilots, the right-side pilot, who continued to hold the stick back and and retained command. The left-side pilot didn't realize that was occurring until it was too late.
They can still be disconnected with sufficient opposite force, there's a shearable torque tube between them.
There’s three pitot tubes. There were ADs issued over them icing over. Airbus replaced them multiple times with tubes from different vendors.
In the final report, the first major issue is “Temporary inconsistency between the measured speeds, likely as a result of the obstruction of the pitot tubes by ice crystals, caused autopilot disconnection and reconfiguration to alternate law.”
Icing over of pitot tubes seems more significant to me than I think you’re making it out to be.
How did they not notice their altitude was climbing as they pulled the plane up - they got into a CLIMB rate of 7,000 feet per minute - that's STUPID! WHY climb like that? This has nothing to do with airspeed.
The stall alarm goes off 75 times!
They reduce power to idle for a bit??
It's total nonsense, anyone who has flown a single engine cessna for 200 hours or more would have been able to get out of this easily just based on stall buffet and stall alarms.
There are aircraft, for example the B-2, that can't fly at all without working pitot tubes.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447#Pitot_tu...
But that's not what made me nervous about Airbus. Rather, that's when I learned that Airbuses are flown by side-sticks that aren't mechanically linked while Boeings are flown by yokes which are.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447#Side-sti...
The idea that two pilots can provide conflicting inputs without realizing it bothers me from a design standpoint.