The OP's example would also worked well enough with even just 5 heads; you'd already pass p < 0.05, despite the actual probability of having picked the biased coin still being minuscule.
You have P(H) == 1/1024, P(H|B) == 1/1. And,
Then the probability that you picked a biased coin (P(B))? 1/10^1000. The probability you picked a fair coin (P(F))? (1 - 1/10^1000)
All in all, P(B|H)? Well Bayes rule tells us P(A|B) = P(B|A) * P(A) / P(B). Or in this case, P(B|H) = 1 * 1024 / 10^1000, or approximately 1 / 10 ^ 997.
> For example, if you conducted a study every week for 20 years, you'd both be extremely prolific and expect to have drawn about one wrong conclusion.
This is a prior! In the kind of experimentation I do, I run literally tens of thousands of experiments a day.
1 / (1/6)^5 ≃ 7776
Let's use your example. Conditional probability is P(A|B), the probability of event A, given that event B was observed. What's the probability that I am a magician, given that I shuffled the deck and when you saw it it was still in new deck order?
Now certainly, there is an astronomically small chance that this was observed due to random chance. And yet if you observed this, I'd expect that you would, with relatively high confidence, believe that I stacked the deck.
For example, if you conducted a study every week for 20 years, you'd both be extremely prolific and expect to have drawn about one wrong conclusion.
The example is a case of an absurd premise (i.e., a fair coin comes up heads 10 times in a row) leading to an absurd conclusion (that the coin is biased). Of course, this is exactly the guarantee the hypothesis test provides: under robust assumptions, you'll draw the wrong conclusion only rarely.