I am under the same impression and have some circumstantial evidence supporting it as someone who's been inspecting the code of the Zoom client (just for fun): their Windows client uses a 3rd party library that is used virtually only in China whose documentation is available only in Mandarin.
On a tangential note, I got surprised to see no traces of attempts to make inspection harder on their client software. Even function names remain intact in some cases, which I assume would not happen if they had a malicious intent like embedding a backdoor.
> We need to promote our own opensource and free tools to our friends and family, we will get the last laugh.
Although I agree that there should be viable alternatives to available tools for online communication without the possibility of being eavesdropped, I can see why such things do not exist. It'd be too inconvenient for the law enforcement. And if you take things from the perspective of whether that thing makes the job of the law enforcement harder, you'd notice such things tend not to exist. As a principle, popular software should not have a means to prevent data going through the software from getting inspected by the law enforcement. Does Dropbox offer end-to-end encryption? Of course not. Is there a popular easy-to-use disk encryption software? There was TrueCrypt, which is gone for an obvious reason. Does Gmail implement end-to-end encryption for emails? Of course not...
For what it's worth, this is a bad assumption.
Someone hiding bad behavior from a reverse engineer wants it to be in friendlyMisnamedFunction, not in lkjwer23_aic. If you remove all the English semantics from the binary, a reverser is free to focus on the behavior; if you don't, you can lure them into a false sense of security.
I assumed it's not because it claims to be E2E, when I checked the fingerprint of a contract it looked good and reports are that the taliban uses it for internal comms
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/26/world/asia/afghanistan-wh...
You can determine if a given version of the app is conforming to the protocol or not at some point in time.
After a short search I was able to find this attempt: https://www.delaat.net/rp/2018-2019/p25/report.pdf
Which was inconclusive.
Reverse DNS for the IP is handled by oracle cloud.
That said, I wouldn't touch an Oracle product with a very long bargepole, even if bandwidth was free.
For precise communication, consider edit your original post.
Did the Keybase team move to China?
Edit: This IP is hosted by Oracle https://bgp.he.net/ip/193.122.212.125 Reverse DNS for the IP is handled by oracle cloud.
Although zoom ostensibly has its headquarters in san jose, the code is developed 100% in mainland China. We should consider the face that the chinese military likely has access to MITM all zoom conversations on demand. I find the situation disquieting, but I am of two minds because I also feel almost the same level of distrust to facebook and whatsapp conversations.