> Circumventing otherwise strict security rules for their own domains is shady in its own right.

In most fights between adding a user feature and protecting user privacy, if the feature cannot be added otherwise, feature wins. It's only "shady" if you're already assuming the feature vendor is a hostile actor.

The consistent Chrome experience enabled by logging the browser in is hells useful (especially in this era of mobile device + desktop device; no more having to remember if I bookmarked that article on my phone or my desktop or my work PC, etc.).

> In most fights between adding a user feature and protecting user privacy, if the feature cannot be added otherwise, feature wins.

/Not/ protecting user privacy is always shady, regardless of who the actor is. When done knowingly, it's almost always hostile.

The easiest way to protect user privacy is to never implement any features. Can't hack what isn't there.

Once we assume that's not the decision that'll be made (because obviously), the question becomes whether the feature can be implemented at all while respecting user privacy.

And if the answer is yes, we can expect it to happen.

> The easiest way to protect user privacy is to never implement any features.

I don't subscribe to this school of thought, personally. I suppose that's where our differences lay.

>> The easiest way to protect user privacy is to never implement any features. > I don't subscribe to this school of thought, personally.

What school of thought do you subscribe to? I had assumed that this

> /Not/ protecting user privacy is always shady

... being an absolutist statement, meant that you were open to the easiest way of protecting user privacy, which is "Don't increase the security surface area at all," i.e. add no new features.