Additional factors are of course always safer, but everything is a trade-off between security and usability, and users should have control.
The agencies consider single-factor authentication, as the only control mechanism, to be inadequate for high-risk transactions involving access to customer information or the movement of funds to other parties. Financial institutions offering Internet-based products and services to their customers should use effective methods to authenticate the identity of customers using those products and services. The authentication techniques employed by the financial institution should be appropriate to the risks associated with those products and services. Account fraud and identity theft are frequently the result of single-factor (e.g., ID/password) authentication exploitation. Where risk assessments indicate that the use of single-factor authentication is inadequate, financial institutions should implement multifactor authentication, layered security, or other controls reasonably calculated to mitigate those risks.
Funny that. The PSD2 regulations in Europe do.[0]
The downside is that they don't mandate properly secure 2FA, so we have a mishmash of SMS, time-based tokens and whatever else passes for various banks under the regulations.[ß]
0: https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/psd2-authentication-require...
ß: My UK bank requires locally generated, time-based reader/app tokens, and has done so as long as I've lived here. My Finnish bank uses SMS.
I think that's a pretty important detail. With my bank they could only get up to $1000 without further verification.
A bank would not let you empty an account with just a debit card and PIN, assuming there was some non-trivial amount of money in there.
2. They will return my money if I reported the theft in a timely fashion.
Robin hood seems to be doing neither.
Wouldn't that be out of the graciousness of the bank (or PR)?
Edit: You may still be on the hook for overdraft fees from e.g. authorized payments, and it may take some time for the bank to indemnify you, which is why the conventional wisdom is that CCs are safer than debit cards from a fraud perspective.
[0] https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0213-lost-or-stolen-cr...
[1] and is in fact legally required to: https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/caletters/2008/0807...
FDIC insurance (and its equivalent in other countries) is something completely unrelated - it's for cases when the bank is unable to pay you because it goes bankrupt for some reason (which may include massive fraud done to the bank or by the bank), it's not for cases when your money gets lost in some other way.
Since the bank is on the hook for giving out customer money to random con artists, their threshold for investigating suspicious account activity is much lower.
Relevant Mitchell & Webb comedy sketch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CS9ptA3Ya9E
I disagree.
The Robinhood system includes their disbursement process.
In this case, someone with access to a username and password managed to, without passing any of the other typical 2FA checks in finance (Calling the the account holder, snail-mail confirmation, actual 2FA tokens) managed to get Robinhood to wire them money.
This is absolutely a compromise of their disbursement system. If a bank gave all my money to some random asshat that showed up to a branch with my debit card, the blame for that lies on my bank.
This is typical liability laundering.