"(A)ll data is encrypted before it's stored on the backend" statement is completely worthless unless (at the very least) you also describe how the keys are generated and managed.
I'd like to hear from Dropbox how this works instead of speculation.
With luck the same sets of staff will not have access to both, et cetera.
Under what circumstances?
the government needs to comply with the provisions of the electronic communications privacy act by obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause (or in some cases a court order from a judge). these safeguards protect user privacy, even when the government is involved.
This is why encryption of data in the cloud, where the keys are not held by the provider, is essential.
See: "How Dropbox sacrifices user privacy for cost savings"
http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2011/04/how-dropbox-sacrifices-u...
architect this flag as part of any 'admin' access and describe it on your website - users would feel better about it
if the feds know your system is designed in a way that you can't help but to inform users that data has been accessed, it might dissuade them from approaching you with warrants in the first place
The govt will just request that they change the code so that you're in compliance.
also the wording can not mention 'warrant' or 'fbi' so it has to be something like 'third party access'
I have been meaning to do this as a 'project' with full legal advice etc. and suggest it to google, other cloud providers
Edit: found that rsync.net already do this, in a different way, as a warrant canary: http://www.rsync.net/resources/notices/canary.txt
In Dropbox's case, users can expect the following:
- Data is probably secure from sniffers
That's it.It matters little whether "Drew has physical access to our storage servers anymore". Your code obviously has easy access to the keys used to encrypt and decrypt the data. This means all of the following scenarios are possible:
- User's data is obtained via the government (users
aren't necessarily even informed about this)
- User's data is obtained by rouge employee (potentially
leaking to _anyone_ or _anything_)
- User's data is obtained by hacker (again, implies ZERO
assurance of data security).
So don't flash around "AES this or that" without making it absolutely clear to the average user that what you are doing is the equivalent of storing their data in a shed guarded by a lock that can be accessed by anyone who can find (or demand) the key that you've hidden under a rock somewhere.we believe that what we advertise is in our userbase's best interest. in theory, we could generate a lengthy document attempting to explain every possible way dropbox could be compromised. but in practice, discussing these extremely unlikely theoretical vulnerabilities would generate undue fear. as an ironic sidenote: this thread was spawned by an attempt we made to clarify our handling of court orders (see: http://www.businessinsider.com/dropbox-updates-security-term... )
I say "undue fear" for a couple reasons. first and foremost because we are vigilant about making sure that user data is never compromised. our reputation would be permanently damaged if dropbox is compromised. we have a lot of smart, security conscious people making sure data in dropbox is safe.
we're also listening to feedback we've been hearing from the community on things we can do to improve security. a couple concrete examples: we're working on better protecting the authentication token (config.db) so that gaining access to a dropbox account on a compromised machine is much more difficult. similarly we're working on a performant way to transmit file metadata over SSL on the mobile apps.
secondly, we believe that storing data in dropbox is far more safe than the alternatives. we've designed dropbox to protect user data against threats of all kinds, but we've focused the most on helping users avoid the most common threats to their data: not having any backups at all, not having current backups, accidentally deleting files, losing hours of work, leaving files on the wrong computer, losing a USB drive with sensitive info, protecting from curious snoopers on the dorm network, etc.
for all the talk of security issues in the last few weeks, we're not aware of anybody having been affected by these theoretical vulnerabilities. on the flip side, we have (literally) saved thousands of college kids from losing their theses :-).
I am most disappointed in Dropbox because you had made statements like all our data is AES encrypted and our staff do not have access to your data. These are clearly incomplete for the former and are plainly not true for the latter. They are misleading and un-ethical in that they have assisted you in gaining you all these customers. As stated above you should clearly stop using security as selling point and only state you provide security in transit (https) or actually put in place technical measures to make those statements true.
Personally I will no longer be recommending Dropbox and will instead recommend your competitors including changing my answers on Quora: http://www.quora.com/Dropbox?q=dropbox
- All transmission of file data occurs over an encrypted channel (SSL).
- All files stored on Dropbox servers are encrypted (AES-256)
and this turns out to mean "file metadata may not be encrypted" and "all files stored on Dropbox servers are encrypted with the same key (AES-256)"... well, people are going to call "snake oil".In that context, statements like "we believe that what we advertise is in our userbase's best interest" make my ears prick up. I'm not a crypto expert, but this sort of thing does not seem like a straightforward response to the OP.
This is why I trust DropBox with my data: because I'm a paying customer. That means our goals are aligned.
On a related note, Dropbox is not the only company that advertises security even though what really is offered is kind-of-security. See Backblaze, for example — yes, the data is (supposedly) encrypted using my private key, which (supposedly) only stays on my machine, but I can't be sure because it isn't auditable, and to do a restore I have to supply my private key to the Backblaze website, instead of using a local decryption tool. Not good.
I like the idea of what your service does, but this statement just advertizes the success of one feature to back up the failings of another.
If you just want to offer file storage, just set up an http-only svn server and be done with it.
If you want to offer proper encryption, do so, or don't say that you do.
all data on dropbox can be made shareable and is web viewable. as a consequence, we do need the ability to decrypt in the cloud.
re. employee access to files - there are controls to prevent this. for example, even drew (founder/CEO), doesn't have physical access to our storage servers anymore.
for very sensitive data, there's always the option to use truecrypt (we even offer this as a recommendation in our security documentation: https://www.dropbox.com/terms#security)