I'm not defining consciousness like that. I defined consciousness (rather vaguely, but in line with the common usage) as having internal experiences, like an inner voice or qualia. I am then asserting that (disregarding spiritual ideas) it is obvious that sperm cells don't have this kind of consciousness, while 5 year old children do have it (and at least some animals as well!).

My point is that panpsychism seems to me to be using definitions to try to hide away the fact that it can't actually answer the questions of consciousness that we are really interested in any more than brain-based theories can.

If your definition of consciousness is vague, how can it be obvious that X does not conform with it?

What test do you apply?

Since there is no way at the moment to formalize the common sense definition of consciousness, I'll use what I have at the moment.

I can well define "consciousness" formally as anything you like, even as something that vaguely intersects with the common-sense definition, like the information schema people did. But the fact of the matter is that we first have to understand consciousness, the vague common-sense concept, and only after we understand it can we give a precise formal definition that is actually useful.

Otherwise, it would be like defining the mass of an object to be the volume of an object - there is some overlap, and it is a perfectly formally defined, but it's just not the right definition for what you want to explain.

Let me ask you - do you believe that when a photon in the red wavelength hits an electron, the electron "sees red" in the same sense that you "see red" when that same photon hits your retina? What about your retina itself? Does it "see red" in the same sense that you do?

I've read your discussion, and having talked about something related recently, came up with a (IMHO) descent definition:

Consciousness of a physical system A is the difference between the behavior of A and the behavior of a system Aavg, that has the same content as A, but mixed randomly (think water and organics of the right weight and proportion simply mixed in a barrel).

This apparently breaks when you start using tools though.

Im afraid that by this definition, a cell in my body is about as conscious as I am, and the LHC is far more conscious than I am.

Also, this definition does nothing to capture the difference between a philosophical zombie and a human, or help us tell if there is such a difference.

I don't think a cell in your body is as conscious as you are by that definition. You can probably abuse much more energy to get more difference. You have to sum over the entire volume.

As for LHC, it actually needs quite a lot of people to be "conscious". E.g. to be powered and able to operate, so it makes sense, that, as an organization, it is more conscious than you are.

On the philosophical zombie I don't believe there's any difference in consciousness to a human, and the definition matches that idea.

Now I'd challenge anyone to give a better definition in terms of the number of examples contradicting it.