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Re:Epic, Spotify, and Tinder form advocacy group to push for... by gpm on Thursday September 24, 2020 @09:33PM (#24585707)
> Apple does not have a “monopoly on iPhone hardware and iOS”. This is a fundamental misunderstand of the term. You cannot have a monopoly on your own product, because a monopoly is a state of a market and your own product is not a market.

Precedent deeply disagrees with you on this. At the supreme court level see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services Inc. To quote the first paragraph of wikipedia out of laziness: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastman_Kodak_Co._v._Image_Tec....

> Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), is a 1992 Supreme Court decision in which the Court held that even though an equipment manufacturer lacked significant market power in the primary market for its equipment—copier-duplicators and other imaging equipment—nonetheless, it could have sufficient market power in the secondary aftermarket for repair parts to be liable under the antitrust laws for its exclusionary conduct in the aftermarket.[1] The reason was that it was possible that, once customers were committed to the particular brand by having purchased a unit, they were "locked in" and no longer had any realistic alternative to turn to for repair parts.

This has been held at the appeals court level to apply to products as well as repair services (because why wouldn't it). See newcal industries v. ikon office solution. Unfortunately since a large portion of the opinion focuses on this, it's hard to find a single quote that summarizes. Read the background and then search aftermarket in the opinion: https://www.leagle.com/decision/20081551513f3d103811540:

Here is my best attempt at picking out a relevant paragraph that explains the law:

> Taking these cases together, three relevant principles emerge. First, the law permits an antitrust claimant to restrict the relevant market to a single brand of the product at issue (as in Eastman Kodak). Second, the law prohibits an antitrust claimant from resting on market power that arises solely from contractual rights that consumers knowingly and voluntarily gave to the defendant (as in Queen City Pizza and Forsyth). Third, in determining whether the defendant's market power falls in the Queen City Pizza category of contractually-created market power or in the Eastman Kodak category of economic market power, the law permits an inquiry into whether a consumer's selection of a particular brand in the competitive market is the functional equivalent of a contractual commitment, giving that brand an agreed-upon right to monopolize its consumers in an aftermarket. The law. permits an inquiry into whether consumers entered into such "contracts" knowing that they were agreeing to such a commitment.

So I don't think it's a slamdunk whether or not Apple's secondary markets here are aftermarkets that anti trust can be applied to because of the third point in the above paragraph, but it's not a slamdunk the other way either, and your claim that you can't have a monopoly on IPhone apps because IPhone is apple's product is fundamentally flawed (rather, if it's true, it's because purchasing an IPhone is akin to signing a contract that you will only use IPhone apps distributed from Apple, and that you will only use Apple's payment system on those IPhone apps).

Re:Epic, Spotify, and Tinder form advocacy group to push for... by nodamage on Thursday September 24, 2020 @09:59PM (#24585842)
Note that Eastman Kodak is viewed in legal circles as the exception to the general rule of disallowing single-brand relevant markets, due to the particular circumstances of the case.

In Kodak, customers originally purchased Kodak copiers without any restrictions, and then several years later Kodak changed their policy and stopped selling repair parts to third-party servicers, which left customers locked into buying repair services from Kodak instead.

In Newcal, IKON amended their lease agreements with their customers without disclosing to the customers that the length of their service contracts would be extended as well, similarly leaving customers locked into buying services from IKON.

In both of those cases, there was an element of deception, and customers did not know that they would be restricted in the aftermarket when they made their original purchase. It's tough to argue that those circumstances apply here, since Apple's policies have been clear since the launch of the App Store and have never changed. In fact, some courts have interpreted Kodak to mean that absent a change in policy, Kodak does not apply.

Note that the paragraph you quoted specifically says: "the law permits an inquiry into whether a consumer's selection of a particular brand in the competitive market is the functional equivalent of a contractual commitment, giving that brand an agreed-upon right to monopolize its consumers in an aftermarket." I expect Apple will be able to successfully convince the court that this is indeed the case.

Re:Epic, Spotify, and Tinder form advocacy group to push for... by gpm on Thursday September 24, 2020 @10:06PM (#24585874)
If I was epic I think I would be focusing on the fact that consumers generally don't have any idea about the restriction on payment providers, and that the terms of that restriction have changed over time.

But that gives up on half the case, so we'll see what they do.

Re:Epic, Spotify, and Tinder form advocacy group to push for... by nodamage on Thursday September 24, 2020 @10:58PM (#24586138)
That's true, but for Epic's tying claim they've argued that the tying product is iOS app distribution and the tied product is payment processing, which again relies on establishing that iOS app distribution is in fact a valid antitrust market.

If that fails, they might be able to amend their claim to argue that iPhones are the tying product, but then that opens up a different set of questions about how much market power Apple has in the overall smartphone market.

(They also need to establish that payment processing is actually a distinct product or service from app distribution, which is not necessarily obviously true and depends on a separate set of factors.)

Re:Epic, Spotify, and Tinder form advocacy group to push for... by zaroth on Thursday September 24, 2020 @09:51PM (#24585794)
> "Your claim that you can't have a monopoly on IPhone apps because IPhone is apple's product is fundamentally flawed".

I never claimed that at all.

It's a question for the courts to decide if it wants to allow Apple's current App Store contract to stand, and if not, what remedy they propose. But it wouldn't be because Apple has a "monopoly" on the iPhone or iOS, it would ride partly on the question of, from your own source, "whether consumers entered into such "contracts" knowing that they were agreeing to such a commitment", and I suppose partly on whether the contract is illegally anti-competitive even if it was entered into knowingly.

Further quoting from your own source, Newcal v Icon;

"First and foremost, the relevant market must be a product market. The consumers do not define the boundaries of the market; the products or producers do. Second, the market must encompass the product at issue as well as all economic substitutes for the product. As the Supreme Court has instructed, "The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it." As such, the relevant market must include "the group or groups of sellers or producers who have actual or potential ability to deprive each other of significant levels of business."

Further reading of that case (a great example by the way) involves discussion of an interesting case against Domino's pizza. Franchisees attempted to sue because they were contractually required to purchase ingredients from Domino's, and Domino's therefore held a monopoly on their ingredients. It's not that substitute ingredients didn't exist, they just weren't allowed by Domino's to buy them.

Similarly with the App Store, it's not that other apps don't exist, it's just that contracturally, iOS doesn't allow you to download them. There is a competitive market for apps (very clearly!) but yet the market for apps on an iPhone is contractually limited in a way which you might be tempted to call a monopoly. The Third Circuit ruled otherwise. As long as customers knowingly entered into this contract, the existence of the contract provision does not create a illegal monopoly.

> "The Third Circuit held that the contractually created difference among otherwise-substitutable products was insufficient to create an economically distinct antitrust submarket."

The counter argument is given as Kodak v. Image Technical Services. In this case, Kodak is monopolizing the market for repair parts and services. The Supreme Court rules that buyers of Kodak machines could not reasonably predict that such a purchase would lock them into buying overpriced Kodak parts and services down the line.

> The Court rejected that analogy on the ground that the consumers could not, at the time of purchase, reasonably discover that Kodak monopolized the service market and charged supracompetitive prices for its service. Id. Kodak's market power in parts and services, therefore, did not arise from a knowing contractual (or quasi-contractual), arrangement.

By comparison, no one who is buying an iPhone could reasonably be unaware that the App Store is the only way to install apps on it.

More importantly, Apple isn't being sued by consumers. It's being sued by App Developers, who did certainly quite knowingly enter into a contract with Apple to write apps for their platform.

I don't know of any statue that requires Apple to provide access to their own device to third party software developers. Third parties can write an app for iOS or not, but when they do so, developers enter into a contract with Apple that decidedly comes with some conditions.

Re:Epic, Spotify, and Tinder form advocacy group to push for... by gpm on Thursday September 24, 2020 @10:00PM (#24585843)
If that first sentence isn't what you meant then I'm afraid I've totally missed your point, and continue to miss it.
Re:Epic, Spotify, and Tinder form advocacy group to push for... by zaroth on Thursday September 24, 2020 @10:19PM (#24585948)
Perhaps I don't know what you mean "monopoly on iPhone Apps". I said they don't have a monopoly on iPhone or iOS, because such a statement is nonsensical.

It seems to me that you moved the goalposts to talking about iPhone apps.

I mean, they obviously don't have a monopoly on iPhone apps either (probably 99.99% of all apps are not written by Apple). What they have is significant and costly contractual terms which they require developers to agree to before they let you publish an app on their device. Some argue that those terms may be illegally anti-competitive, but it wouldn't be because of a "monopoly".

The court case you referenced emphatically states that explicit contractual provisions cannot form the boundaries of an antitrust submarket.

Fundamentally consumers have a choice when they buy a smartphone. They can choose from several different manufacturers, and the market is highly competitive. The whole beauty of a capitalist market is that companies get to choose the features and experience their product provides to differentiate themselves, and as long as consumers have a choice between products, those products should live or die based on those features and experience.

Apple is clearly doing quite well in a highly competitive market making the product design choices they are making, because consumers are choosing that experience over the alternative.

To bring it back to the Kodak case, if we were to consider whether Apple has a monopoly on iPhone repair & service, I would say, "Hey gpm, that's entirely possible. I don't know if they do or don't, but it's important that they aren't anti-competitively dominating that market!" Repair and service of a brand is logically quite different from the brand itself.