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Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf] by bawolff on Thursday September 24, 2020 @04:55AM (#24576664)
Then you don't trust anything.

Or are you literally replacing all OEM firmware, using purely open hardware. Using purely open source firmware. Verifying the firmware you have corresponds to the sources you have. Verifying that there is no additional secret firmware you don't know about, verifying that the hardware you have actually corresponds to the open hardware specs you have, etc. i.e. Doing an insane amount of steps that are so impractical, you might as well make your own computer starting from first principles.

Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf] by cookiengineer on Thursday September 24, 2020 @05:05AM (#24576714)
I totally agree with you there that most things are super unpractical and impossible to realize for end-users (or even engineers).

What you can do though is trying your best that you can influence with your own skillset. I would never claim that any device is secure (heck, eversince BadUSB not even my power transformator is) but I'd have a better feeling when using coreboot that I configured, built and flashed via my CH341a adapter instead of an OEM SeaBIOS, for example. I mean, software is my skillset. Software I can influence. Hardware: not so much.

I don't know whether there are government-level exploits available for coreboot or libreboot, but I think that's the level of security where we can just dump our hardware into the trash anyways.

Additionally I don't have the skillset of verifying that a RISC-V chipset is really open, verified or secure. Therefore I would have to trust somebody else to do it, which might become the centralized point where the red tape fails for all of us.

When it comes to open hardware, mntmn [1] got pretty far already. Even though I personally think that the touchpad is still unusable in terms of modern UX. But I really admire them for what they do, and that they do not compromise on their core principles.

[1] https://github.com/mntmn

Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf] by bawolff on Thursday September 24, 2020 @05:35AM (#24576880)
As a slightly less snarky addendum to this: Good risk management is all about balancing the liklihood and severity of a threat against the cost of mitigating it.

If you spend $1000 (or equivalent in time/whatever you care about) mitigating a risk that at worst would cause you $10 worth of damage, that is a poor use of resources.

Of course some people like locking things down as a hobby. Nothing wrong with that, but at that point you're doing it for fun, not to protect yourself.

Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf] by DyslexicAtheist on Thursday September 24, 2020 @05:08AM (#24576741)
this.

the only acceptable phrasing of "I don't trust anything" is to finish that sentence with "... therefore I don't use computers" ... the very idea of using computers means that data is processed. and so eliminating all attack surface is not to play.

Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf] by e12e on Thursday September 24, 2020 @02:27PM (#24581828)
I go out in public often. There I will be seen by others. I do not trust all of them, I behave and (inter)act accordingly.

You can "not trust" computers, and use them.

Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf] by megous on Thursday September 24, 2020 @10:02AM (#24578672)
This is pretty much what I do with Pinephone. :) It was not completely impractical. Just a few months of work.

I wouldn't want to do that on x86 platform though. A64 SoC is simple enough that getting close to this ideal is possible.