Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf]
by eeZah7Ux on Thursday September 24, 2020 @07:51AM
(#24577671)
The secure boot "solution" requires trusting a huge amount of closed software and hardware.
It's supposed to protect from a very theoretical risk.
Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf]
by vlowther on Thursday September 24, 2020 @10:49AM
(#24579124)
Boot time pre-OS malware is not a theoretical risk. At all.
Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf]
by eeZah7Ux on Thursday September 24, 2020 @07:36PM
(#24584936)
No. The attack is real. The risk is just not there. Most systems have valuable data on the current OS rather than a future one.
Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf]
by raxxorrax on Thursday September 24, 2020 @05:01AM
(#24576692)
Right, there are such scenarios, but it comes with disadvantages that are also relevant to security, to a larger degree in my opinion, and the mechanism is not excluding every form of rootkit. If you open a malignant attachment and execute it, there is just so much you can do.
According to the report there is, and I believe the report is correct, when the "malignant OS" is not actually a full OS, but rather a rootkit. This rootkit might have been the result of a non-technical user opening a mail with a strange attachment.