News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf] by hvdijk on Thursday September 24, 2020 @04:52AM (#24576656)
> There is no scenario where non-technical users boot into a malignant OS.

According to the report there is, and I believe the report is correct, when the "malignant OS" is not actually a full OS, but rather a rootkit. This rootkit might have been the result of a non-technical user opening a mail with a strange attachment.

Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf] by eeZah7Ux on Thursday September 24, 2020 @07:51AM (#24577671)
The secure boot "solution" requires trusting a huge amount of closed software and hardware.

It's supposed to protect from a very theoretical risk.

Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf] by vlowther on Thursday September 24, 2020 @10:49AM (#24579124)
Boot time pre-OS malware is not a theoretical risk. At all.
Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf] by eeZah7Ux on Thursday September 24, 2020 @07:36PM (#24584936)
No. The attack is real. The risk is just not there. Most systems have valuable data on the current OS rather than a future one.
Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf] by raxxorrax on Thursday September 24, 2020 @05:01AM (#24576692)
Right, there are such scenarios, but it comes with disadvantages that are also relevant to security, to a larger degree in my opinion, and the mechanism is not excluding every form of rootkit. If you open a malignant attachment and execute it, there is just so much you can do.
Re:NSA Technical Report on UEFI Secure Boot Customization [pdf] by shawnz on Friday September 25, 2020 @09:14AM (#24589333)
There are no security disadvantages that come with enabling Secure Boot. Doing so doesn't give anyone any additional control over your workstation.