Re:Why is unauthenticated encryption insecure?
by davidhyde on Sunday September 20, 2020 @04:40PM
(#24537224)
What about using a time based one time password algorithm instead of a challenge-response mechanism? Most embedded systems have a real time clock. Would it make sense to use this technology for that? https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-based_One-time_Password...
Re:Why is unauthenticated encryption insecure?
by cybergibbons on Sunday September 20, 2020 @05:01PM
(#24537390)
RTCs are actually quite rare, especially in a lot of the lower power RF SoCs.
Drift would also be an issue - most move at least 10 minutes a year. That's with good temperatures, not being left in a hot car or at body temp.
If you could solve the drift issue then it would be pretty good I think, it's an interesting idea.
Re:Why is unauthenticated encryption insecure?
by davidhyde on Sunday September 20, 2020 @07:17PM
(#24538244)
Maybe you could use the secure connection to resync the time or some other clock with the authenticated server. I guess that’s just another request / response type of arrangement though. And then any breakdown of communication for an extended period of time would brick the whole thing.
EDIT: Maybe the time based one time password algorithm can be configured to be made less time granular (say daily) so that it can handle clock drift.
Re:Why is unauthenticated encryption insecure?
by renewiltord on Monday September 21, 2020 @03:37AM
(#24540801)
Actually, why doesn't signing a time-stamped unlock work?
Re:Why is unauthenticated encryption insecure?
by PowerBar on Saturday October 03, 2020 @06:54PM
(#24675276)
That's one of the other popular strategies, but relies on both devices have accurate clocks. With computers and servers (where the strategy is used quite a bit, sometimes in combination with challenge-response), it's quite easy. If you're working with something non-networked or battery powered like a garage door opener, clock drift becomes a serious issue.
If you have a door lock that accepts "lock", "unlock" and "report status", a MITM attacker only needs to capture the encrypted & signed "unlock" command, then replay it later.
Many workarounds were developed to mitigate this such as random values, incrementing values and timestamps, but most were found insecure. Challenge-response systems with a short validity period are one of the better systems in use, but require bi-directional communication which can make some products (ex: garage door openers) more expensive.