Re:Large-scale Abuse of Contact Discovery in Mobile Messenge...
by inputmice on Wednesday September 16, 2020 @03:06PM
(#24496233)
As someone who has thought a good deal about contact discovery the mitigation techniques section is actually pretty interesting.
Quicksy.im, an XMPP client but based on phone numbers and with built in contact discovery, I developed ~2 years ago, already does very strict rate limiting, but the paper mentions some other techniques as well that I should probably look at.
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Re:Large-scale Abuse of Contact Discovery in Mobile Messenge...
by bigiain on Wednesday September 16, 2020 @09:17PM
(#24500124)
Like with websites and password managers, rate limiting works fine when going via the expected auth service. Doesn't help at all when NSA/MSS/Mossad have popped the contact hash database off Whispersystem's backend.
(Admittedly, if that's your threat model, I hope you have enough magic amulet's in the submarine you now live in...)