Re:Not Anonymous: Attack Reveals BitTorrent Users on Tor Net...
by demosthenes on Tuesday April 12, 2011 @04:30PM
(#2439109)
Because of Tor's design there's no need for trust at the exit node. Plus, you hop between exit nodes at 10 minute intervals, giving any one node at best a scrappy picture of your activities. You can also blacklist exit nodes that you consider suspicious.
Even if an exit node's logs are compromised an adversary wouldn't know your identity if you haven't given it up in the compromised traffic.
What better solutions are available? As far as I know Tor is still the most resilient option out there.
How do you know if that node with the pretty flag saying it's in Switzerland isn't logging all IPs, DNS requests, and packet headers straight to another Room 641A?
I just dislike when people suggest things like Tor without having used it themselves and seen the glaring issues and essential deficiencies with the tool.
Especially when there are such better and faster solutions available.