50% of what is the issue, though. Some arbitrary descriptive market the target company preferred to be used for the antitrust analysis, or the actual market in which substitution, and thus actual competition, occurs as found by the court hearing the case?
Because defining the relevant market is not infrequently a contentious point in antitrust.
Market power is the ability to coerce people into paying more for something via a mechanism other than actually offering a better product or service. A textbook example which most people would agree is bad is a trust/cartel situation where a few players artificially limit supply, and then can raise the price on consumers because there are no competitors. But if a firm is able to drive up prices with impunity for any reason, it's likely they possess market power.
When a firm possesses excess market power it's good for that firm, but bad for the market, consumers, and society. By definition a firm with a lot of market power has very little competition, so even as their margins grow, product quality will decline and price will increase. (Sound like Apple in 2020?) And new firms will find it difficult to compete in that market even as the firm with market power grows very rich, which exacerbates the problem of wealth inequality. (Sound like America in 2020?)
A society which doesn't place some sort of checks on a firm's ability to acquire market power ends up being a place where the way to get ahead is to find an unfair advantage, abuse it, and screw everyone else. (Again, sound familiar?)
At this point it's almost certain that Google is violating antitrust regulation by abusing its market power (proven in the EU, and the US looks poised to start filing lawsuits this year). Apple, Amazon and a few others are up for debate and it's also fair to say that antitrust regulations should evolve to address the tech industry more effectively. The antitrust problem isn't limited to tech however, anti-competitive behaviors of questionable legality have proliferated all over the US since the 80s due to a lax regulatory environment.
If you want to learn more about this topic, Matt Stoller's newsletter "BIG" on Substack is a phenomenal place to start.
How exactly does Apple "coerce people into paying more for their phones via a mechanism other than actually offering a better product or service", and what is that mechanism?
> But if a firm is able to drive up prices with impunity for any reason, it's likely they possess market power.
How is Apple actually able to "drive up prices with impunity for any reason"? It seems to me, the more Apple raises iPhone prices, the more people are priced out and decide to switch to a cheaper phone instead.
In this case, once you buy an iPhone, you're forced to use Apple's system to make in-app purchases. The tying product is the phone, and the tied product is the in-app purchase.
So you need to show that Apple has sufficient market power in the smartphone market, and that is where the question of the ability to control prices of phones comes in.
(Neither does Apple v. Pepper.)
But since you mentioned it, I'm not really sure that Epic will succeed with their argument that the "iOS App Distribution" market is the relevant tying product market absent an analysis of the overall smartphone market.
The government playbook in this sort of situation is normally to start subpoena'ing emails, execs etc. and look for hard evidence of actual anti-competitive practices. They're not only interested in a business model as it's described in the media, they want to know what company execs actually did. If they find something they file a suit.
Well, assuming it is one based on abuse of market power and not the other kinds of antitrust violations (e.g., combination in restraint of trade, etc.), it would fail if the plaintiff couldn't establish that Apple had market power in the market for the product for which they allegedly abused market power. If that was iPhones, for instance, that would be the market for iPhones plus whatever products empirically people substitute for iPhones in response to pricing changes. (Of course, if Apple has market power, there is some range in which the “plus...” part is “none”, since market or pricing power is the ability to raise prices without driving sales to a competing good.)
If the lawsuit was about selling some popular class of app in which Apple leveraged its monopoly over app distribution, I think the plaintiff could have a pretty strong case.
Keep in mind that even if Apple only had 1% market share in the smartphone market they would still have a "monopoly" over app distribution on their own phones.
If price increases for Fortnite IAP don't, empirically, drive people to stop buying them in favor of alternatives of some kind, yes. Or, rather, you can't define the market that way, but if there is no substitution effect a US court considering an anti-trust claim is likely to see that as the relevant market, not some broader, say, battle royale game IAP market in which price-driven substitution does not occur.
I’m much more worried about the government deciding what happens to people randomly than a corporation. I don’t have to buy Apple products. It’s a lot harder for me not to have to deal with a capricious government.
https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-case-filings-alpha
Most antitrust cases are for things like price fixing, bid rigging, and mergers.
U.S. v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S 150 (1940); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 363 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2004), Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. US 356 US (1940); Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Circ. 2012); or In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation 385 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 2004), National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. U.S. 435 U.S. (1878); In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, 618 F 3d 300 (2010); or In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litigation, 739 F.3d 262 (2014).
I picked one at random.
“Topco, a cooperative association of about 25 small and medium-sized independent regional supermarket chains operating in 33 States.”
I also looked up one about Ford vs a limo company that you deleted.
They all involve multiple companies colluding. It has nothing to do with one company setting prices in their own store.
You seem to be under the impression that anti-trust is isolated to monopolies, when clearly it is not. Apple and Google do not need to have a monopoly for the government to decide that their app store business model is anti-competitive, and there doesn't need to be precedence.
I love my choice of AT&T over Comcast. $70 all fees included gigabit up and down.
> When enterprises are not under public ownership, and where regulation does not foreclose the application of antitrust law, two requirements must be shown for the offense of monopolization. First, the alleged monopolist must possess sufficient power in an accurately defined market for its products or services. Second, the monopolist must have used its power in a prohibited way. The categories of prohibited conduct are not closed, and are contested in theory. Historically they have been held to include exclusive dealing, price discrimination, refusing to supply an essential facility, product tying and predatory pricing.
Apple is exercising exclusive control over the market of apps made for the phones they make, so it looks to me like they satisfy the first requirement. The second requirement is murkier, but several of the examples listed sound quite similar to how apple operates its store. IANAL but the more I read about their behavior, the more I become convinced of their monopoly status. Having a monopoly is not a crime. Abusing monopoly power is.
I’m going to let that sit right there.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_antitrust_law
Or, keep on using the definition from your imagination. Whatever works.
As far as IBM (the case was dropped after 13 years and nothing came of it) and MS, they clearly had more than 50%.
And I'll remind you, I'm not a lawyer. Technically, zero lawyers is a good number of lawyers, so I must insist that makes me a good lawyer. Just, I'd suck in court.
Yes and consoles makers have control of their consoles, Roku has control of their platform, as does LG with their WebOS based TVs.
Yet and still when you were challenged to come up with an analogous example, the best you could come up with is multiple companies colluding.
The case involved Kodak refusing to sell parts for its copiers to outside repair shops, and they were sued by the shops who claimed this was anticompetitive behavior.
Kodak made a claim that since there was robust competition in the market for copiers, they couldn't have market power in the aftermarkets for "Kodak copier parts and service." The Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding it was possible to show that there was market power (and therefore antitrust liability) in a secondary market even if the primary market is competitive.
Subsequent cases since Kodak have continually narrowed the scope in which Kodak is applied, and it likely would not apply here because people who buy iPhones have known since the App Store launched in 2008 that the App Store is the only place they'll be able to install apps from.
I recognize your username and I recall seeing good and thoughtful comments from you. I hope to meet you again in a more productive conversation.