KeePass is actually open-source now, and has been audited professionally. You are correct that a full password manager is more complicated than the dice; but the dice don't replace your password manager, so it's an addition to your attack surface, not a replacement.
And no, storing your secret outside the the tamper-resistant memory of a security token isn't better than registering a second (or third, or fourth, or however many makes you comfortable) backup token. HSMs and security tokens exist for good reason, and a cleartext backup loses that benefit.
I don't see anything wrong with marketing this as a cool toy, and as a tool to teach people how computer security works. I'm disturbed to see this marketed as if it solves a real problem, since that's at best a distraction from the steps (e.g., using a password manager and a hardware security token) that will help people practically.
no, you don't. a) it's open source b) it runs locally
so, yes, you have to trust the software to some degree but at least you can audit it and it _should_ be relatively small amount of code. Also, you don't need to trust any remote site or the network because it doesn't use those and that's easy to test without looking at any code.
You can't audit most password managers and even if you could it would be a pain in the butt because they're so much more complicated.
> And of course a YubiKey or equivalent is the real answer.
as others have pointed out this is used to seed the FIDO2 key which makes it _better_ than yubikey because you can't really replace a lost yubikey.