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Re:How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Devel... by roelschroeven on Friday August 21, 2020 @10:07AM (#24234989)
> it's not fully known yet why that procedure didn't prevent the accidents

The only way in the 737 Max to disable MCAS, is to disable electric trim altogether. That means only manual trim is available. When MCAS has trimmed all the way to one of the extremes (as happened in the Ethiopean flight), it requires many revolutions of the trim wheel and superhuman strength to return it to a more appropriate setting (see e.g. https://youtu.be/aoNOVlxJmow?t=750).

Previous generations of the 737 had two buttons related to the electric trim: one disabled the automatic trim system, the other one disabled electric trim altogether. The 737 Max still has two buttons, but they both have the same effect: disable the electric trim altogether. The old system could easily have prevented the crash by disabling MCAS but leaving the electrically assisted trim enabled.

Boeing's procedure to make manual trim adjustments possible is to put the airplane in a dive, because that lowers the aerodynamic forces on the trim surface. When you're only a few hundred feet above the ground, that's not really an option. The pilots re-enabled the electric trim in the hope they could use it in their fight against MCAS. It's the only thing they could think of in the stress of the moment, faced with near-certain death and an airplane actively trying to crash.

In hindsight, after reading accident reports and thinking about it in the comfort of chair that's not crashing, there were things they could have done. Lowering the throttle would have lessened the forces on the trim surface, activating the flaps once the speed was low enough would have disabled MCAS. I can't blame the pilots for not coming up with that in the heat of the moment.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Devel... by ppod on Friday August 21, 2020 @12:32PM (#24236353)
All I said was that as far as I know it isn't fully known. The final report isn't out yet. I'm just an aviation enthusiast, but it's notable that in many discussions anything that could possibly be perceived as even possibly implying any pilot fault is kind of taboo. I'm not saying the pilots did anything wrong, I'm just saying that leaving the stab cut-out switch out of the story seems strange to me.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Devel... by roelschroeven on Friday August 21, 2020 @01:40PM (#24237095)
I don't really understand what you mean by "leaving the stab cut-out switch out of the story". Can you point me to a report that ignores the stab cut-out switch?
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Devel... by ppod on Friday August 21, 2020 @09:18PM (#24240743)
I meant the OP IEEE article that these comments are on.