News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Devel... by throwaway0a5e on Friday August 21, 2020 @07:20AM (#24233920)
The author should stick to software and stay out of airframes.

>I’ll say it again: In the 737 Max, the engine nacelles themselves can, at high angles of attack, work as a wing and produce lift. And the lift they produce is well ahead of the wing’s center of lift, meaning the nacelles will cause the 737 Max at a high angle of attack to go to a higher angle of attack. This is aerodynamic malpractice of the worst kind.

>Apparently the 737 Max pitched up a bit too much for comfort on power application as well as at already-high angles of attack. It violated that most ancient of aviation canons and probably violated the certification criteria of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.

Pure bullshit. Many low wing passenger aircraft have this tendency somewhere in their flight envelope. You can tone it down with some aerodynamic trickery but it's just a fundamental trade-off you get when the engines are below and forward of the wing, the load is above the wing and you pin the throttle. The reason we got ht MAX debacle was because the new 737 had this tendency to a degree and in a portion of the flight envelope different than the old 737 which meant it couldn't ride on the old 737's cert without a bandage over that. The 737 MAX8 handles perfectly reasonably for an airborne bus. What it does not do is handle perfectly reasonably for a 737-800 hence the reason they overlaid half baked software taking inputs from less than adequate hardware systems (well they were adequate for the less critical systems they were designed to feed into).

>Let’s review what the MCAS does: It pushes the nose of the plane down when the system thinks the plane might exceed its angle-of-attack limits; it does so to avoid an aerodynamic stall.

No. It (when it's no malfunctioning and trying to put you in a dive) pushes the nose down when you're getting into the portions of the flight envelope where the MAX flies differently than the old 737 in order to fudge the same handling as the old 737 thereby skating by on the old cert.

Big disasters require many small things to go just right. If the software was more robust this wouldn't have happened. If the hardware was more robust this wouldn't have happened. If the UX had been compatible with the pilots existing knowledge this wouldn't have happened. If the airlines were willing to pony up for type certs this wouldn't have happened. If the FAA had been hard asses this wouldn't have happened. To play it off as "Boeing tried to fix a bad plane with software and failed, whoopies" is exactly the kind of naive surface level postmortem that results in nothing being learned and these kinds of failures happening again. I know that opinions that deviate from "software engineers are angels that never do anything wrong and corporate is the devil also those hardware guys gave the software guys a crap situation to deal with" is not going to be appreciated on HN but the fact of the matter is that any one of the five-ish parties here (FAA, customers, and engineering, software and management within Boeing) could have broken this chain resulting in a different outcome and to prevent future events like this we need to understand the decisions that happened at the margin that prevented the chain of events from being broken.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Devel... by Swenrekcah on Friday August 21, 2020 @07:57AM (#24234123)
>Big disasters require many small things to go just right. If the software was more robust this wouldn't have happened. If the hardware was more robust this wouldn't have happened. If the UX had been compatible with the pilots existing knowledge this wouldn't have happened. If the airlines were willing to pony up for type certs this wouldn't have happened.

None of those things are small. They are all glaring errors willingly overlooked only because of the last point you mentioned which is money.

This is not a case of unfortunate accidents that can advance peoples understanding of avionics. This is a case of serious (in my opinion criminal) negligence motivated by a desire for more money this quarter and the next.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Devel... by dTal on Friday August 21, 2020 @07:52AM (#24234072)
This and other sources disagrees with you: http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm

>This abnormal nose-up pitching is not allowable under 14CFR §25.203(a) "Stall characteristics". Several aerodynamic solutions were introduced such as revising the leading edge stall strip and modifying the leading edge vortilons but they were insufficient to pass regulation. MCAS was therefore introduced to give an automatic nose down stabilizer input during elevated AoA when flaps are up.

The 737 Max was not certifiable without MCAS at all.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Devel... by throwaway0a5e on Friday August 21, 2020 @08:13AM (#24234208)
The law states:

>it must be possible to produce and to correct roll and yaw by unreversed use of the aileron and rudder controls, up to the time the airplane is stalled. No abnormal nose-up pitching may occur. The longitudinal control force must be positive up to and throughout the stall. In addition, it must be possible to promptly prevent stalling and to recover from a stall by normal use of the controls.

Pretty much all commercial airliners are gonna pitch up if you're nose high and have the throttle pinned. Arguably the degree to which the MAX does this is novel. I think it likely handles like shit in that part of the flight envelope but does it really handle like such shit that it's not safe? I don't think so. Remember, this is basically a company truck. You just have to know it's an issue and be trained to operate it properly. Most people would be appalled at the braking characteristics of unladen semi-trucks but it's a non-issue because everyone who has to drive one knows that in those specific circumstances it will handle like crap. At the end of the day it is a matter of degree and opinion. Yes, you can win some quick virtue points by taking a stand in the name of safety and saying that nothing more than the most minor pitch up is acceptable but I think that had this aircraft gone for a FAA certification as a new type it would have passed just fine.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Devel... by Swenrekcah on Friday August 21, 2020 @08:26AM (#24234292)
Not the one you responded to but:

I don't know enough about airplanes to say if the MAX could have certified as it's own type. I'd like to hope it could because if not then that would show a very sorry state of affairs indeed.

But the big issue with the MAX is not that it handles differently, it is that Boeing lied to everyone about that fact. Then they made another semi-unforgivable error by masking the handling with software, ok, but didn't even take the most basic steps available to ensure some redundancy in that software.

It is just so very very bad engineering and mindset that it's hard to describe.

Would I fly on a MAX if and when they get clearance again? Maybe after it's been flying for a year or so, and depending on what some trusted people and institutions say about it.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Devel... by throwaway0a5e on Friday August 21, 2020 @08:37AM (#24234365)
>But the big issue with the MAX is not that it handles differently, it is that Boeing lied to everyone about that fact. Then they made another semi-unforgivable error by masking the handling with software, ok, but didn't even take the most basic steps available to ensure some redundancy in that software.

Which is exactly what I'm saying and the opposite of what the author and DTAL are saying.

>It is just so very very bad engineering and mindset that it's hard to describe.

I don't think it's even a mindset. It's that sort of "nobody is responsible for a large enough part of the system to be able to stop things and force things to be done right" situation that a lot of big-cos get into that results in them crapping out half baked products.

>Would I fly on a MAX if and when they get clearance again? Maybe after it's been flying for a year or so, and depending on what some trusted people and institutions say about it.

For me the decision would hinge on what training the pilots get.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Devel... by Swenrekcah on Friday August 21, 2020 @09:02AM (#24234518)
>I don't think it's even a mindset. It's that sort of "nobody is responsible for a large enough part of the system to be able to stop things and force things to be done right" situation that a lot of big-cos get into that results in them crapping out half baked products.

I agree that plays a part.

But the people in charge of the flight computer software should know better than to have no redundancy.

And the executives definately are able to stop things and force them to be done right, and instill in their employees a mentality of safety-first. But their bonuses might have suffered, so...

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Devel... by jnxx on Friday August 21, 2020 @11:08AM (#24235512)
But that's the same as with the Titanic disaster. There was an incredible amount of things that came together, flawed design, procedures not followed, a spring tide, warnings ignored, until the iceberg hit the ship.

Here a list (and it is probably not exhaustive):

https://www.nbcnews.com/sciencemain/10-causes-titanic-traged...

The logical consequence is that with overwhelming probability, for this big disaster that happened with the 737 Max, a whole number of disasters were narrowly avoided because one of these many requirements for the fatal failure was missing. And theses near misses were not reported, which comes back to a deficient safety culture.