Re:Introducing Pow, a zero-configuration Rack server for Mac...
by sstephenson on Thursday April 07, 2011 @03:00PM
(#2420761)
Just as anyone who can spoof DNS entries could swap some other theoretical Pow installer with a malicious one.
I'm not seeing how Pow's installation process is any less secure than, say, downloading a disk image from a random site.
Re:Introducing Pow, a zero-configuration Rack server for Mac...
by michaelfairley on Thursday April 07, 2011 @03:20PM
(#2420848)
Not if it's served over SSL.
Re:Introducing Pow, a zero-configuration Rack server for Mac...
by tesseract on Thursday April 07, 2011 @05:35PM
(#2421292)
That has nothing to do with whether the installer is a shell script or a binary.
Re:Introducing Pow, a zero-configuration Rack server for Mac...
by wlll on Thursday April 07, 2011 @04:23PM
(#2421058)
This comment is a repeat, but that may not necessarily be true:
Re:Introducing Pow, a zero-configuration Rack server for Mac...
by FooBarWidget on Thursday April 07, 2011 @03:19PM
(#2420844)
Anybody can also spoof DNS entries to point rubygems.org/debian.org/centos.org/redhat.com to a malicious place where the packages contain postinstall scripts that run 'rm -rf /'.
Re:Introducing Pow, a zero-configuration Rack server for Mac...
by dpiddy on Thursday April 07, 2011 @03:55PM
(#2420972)
Maybe for rubygems, not so easy for apt/rpm as they use gpg signing/verification of package indices.
Re:Introducing Pow, a zero-configuration Rack server for Mac...
by FooBarWidget on Thursday April 07, 2011 @05:32PM
(#2421280)
RubyGems also have signing facilities. Most authors don't bother signing however because generating a key is too much trouble.
I think you would be doing the universe a small but meaningful favor not to advertise this installation mechanism.
But it is a very cool tool and a really well-done site. Congrats!