You make the bills and awards proportional to income. Now large company has very little to gain by suing tiny company, but a lot to lose. And tiny co has a lot to gain, and very little to lose.

This makes big cos more risk averse - not a win, but likely no different in practice to the current US litigation landscape.

But it also makes them consider their relationship with Rest of World more carefully.

This is what I advocate for a long time.

On top of that the burden should be made equal by having the CEO participate when I am forced to, or to personally discusd with their lawyers.

In other words, a trial should be for the company a similar pain in the ass as it is for me.

What if there is no value per se? Sueing to cause a company like this to cease and desist would not pertain to your suggestion.

This would stifle small companies even more. Think of the reverse scenario where the large company is infringing on patents/trademark. If you sue, you better win because you risk paying double attorney's fees. With judges and juries making poor decisions a very real possibility that's a scary proposition.

A solution for that is for judges to award costs based on the merits of the case and ability of each party to to pay.

Tricky case where both sides have a legitimate reason to believe they are in the right - no costs awarded. Borderline barratry - full costs awarded.

One FAANG sues another - full costs awarded to the winner. Owner of a small corner shop wins against a FAANG - full costs. Other way round, no costs.

Also to set appropriate levels on what costs can be awarded (kinda like the German model). You want to spend 10M on suing a street market stallholder? Knock yourself out, costs awarded = 10k.

> If you sue, you better win because ...

I think it'd encourage companies to only sue, if the expected value from winning, was large in comparison to one's litigation costs times two.

Which seems ok to me

That's the most bright approach to rules about paying the other part's fees that I've heard about