News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:An update on our security incident by sushshshsh on Friday July 31, 2020 @12:25AM (#24005636)
Dongles are rare here in the US. But I know that bloomberg uses them. I was shocked when I learned that retail banks in Singapore give everyone dongles to log in. In the US that's tyranny Lol
Re:An update on our security incident by Osiris on Friday July 31, 2020 @01:16AM (#24005897)
I work for a crypto currency company and it was the first time in my career that I was issued a YubiKey (I once had an RSA 2fa token for vpn access). It took some getting used to but now I just keep in on my keychain and I always have it with me. I need it for SSO, git, VPN, and basically all internal services.

They aren't sufficient by themselves however, they don't protect from is malicious internal employees.

Re:An update on our security incident by MAGZine on Friday July 31, 2020 @01:34AM (#24006003)
Preparing for malicious internal employees seems to me like preparing for "the big one," in the northwest.

Do a cursory amount of preparation. Outside of basic measures, you're probably doing more harm to the business than good. The likelihood of internal malicious attackers is very low in the grand scheme of things, and the attack surface is huge.

Most companies are going to be compromised by outside attackers—its there that you should focus your energy. If internal attackers are your biggest threat, you've done a fantastic job.

Re:An update on our security incident by Thorrez on Friday July 31, 2020 @04:26AM (#24006798)
Well Twitter did indeed have malicious internal employees.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/former-twit...

If you're hit by a paywall:

https://web.archive.org/web/20200717083254/https://www.washi...

Re:An update on our security incident by lmeyerov on Friday July 31, 2020 @11:44AM (#24009791)
The annual DBIR, which collects incident reports, has ~1/3rd marked as insider ;-)

From a defense-in-depth perspective, agreed: most attacks involve privelege escalation on the inside as soon as they switch from attack vector to breach, even if just host-level, so teams should absolutely "assume breach". Attackers will phish folks, get on their devices, get root, and then have fun there and potentially elsewhere. Ransomware is a more common goal than what Twitter got hit with as it is easily profitable, and it means a takeover. Controls on what most users can do and the ability to scope & report is part of growing up (in the US). It's good Twitter was able to map the attack - I bet many popular social networks couldn't, esp outside of the US or non-top-10.

Shameless plug: A lot of folks use our tool for mapping network logs, and I always encourage to also map out host / app / cloud logs as well, such as logins and the oftentimes black hole that is winlogs.

Re:An update on our security incident by marcan_42 on Friday July 31, 2020 @12:59AM (#24005811)
We're talking about companies, not users. Competent companies can and absolutely do require dongles (or equivalently trustable corporate hardware) to log in to their systems.
Re:An update on our security incident by Ueland on Friday July 31, 2020 @01:41AM (#24006030)
And as a Norwegian it boggles my mind that banks in the US only require username and password to access their bank. We have moved on to a authenticator living on a phone sim card, and you use either that or a "real" hardware dongle for all logins and (most) transactions to confirm your identity.
Re:An update on our security incident by skybrian on Friday July 31, 2020 @02:25AM (#24006211)
US banks do commonly use SMS messages as a second factor, for what it's worth.
Re:An update on our security incident by owenmarshall on Friday July 31, 2020 @08:53AM (#24008121)
> SMS messages as a second factor, for what it's worth

Almost nothing :(

Re:An update on our security incident by TwoBit on Friday July 31, 2020 @12:47AM (#24005759)
rare? I worked at Facebook and every employee needs one.
Re:An update on our security incident by Thorrez on Friday July 31, 2020 @12:41AM (#24005724)
Rare for employees or rare for consumers? Companies can push much higher security onto employees than onto consumers.
Re:An update on our security incident by PopeDotNinja on Friday July 31, 2020 @01:23AM (#24005941)
How do they deal with lost dongles?
Re:An update on our security incident by skybrian on Friday July 31, 2020 @02:32AM (#24006240)
Same as other computer equipment, get another one from tech support and revoke the old one. Or at least, that's how it worked when people still went to the office.
Re:An update on our security incident by marcianx on Friday July 31, 2020 @01:41AM (#24006031)
Employees can revoke access for any of their keys/dongles once they realize they are missing. The company can also send an automated warning and auto-expire a key that's not been used for a while.
Re:An update on our security incident by FireBeyond on Friday July 31, 2020 @03:23AM (#24006489)
When I worked at MSFT in 2006, remote access required a smart card plus credentials.