Again, you haven't actually responded with any hard evidence that these projects were "shut down by the US" – i.e. what exactly did the US do? when exactly did it do it? – just the claim that they were and that the (alleged) fact that they were is "fairly well known" (by whom?).

Concorde was always pushing the envelope in terms of technology and economics. I think a big part of why it ultimately failed, was that improvements in the luxuriousness of business class and first class made it more attractive for many people to spend less money on getting there slower in luxury than spending more to get there quicker but in Concorde's far less luxurious conditions. Add to that the small addressable market (due to the high price point and limited number of aircraft), the post-9/11 aviation downturn, the Air France Flight 4590 accident, the very high maintenance costs, the fact that it was only ever used by two airlines (whose Concorde operations were only profitable because the British and French governments had written off the lion's share of development costs), and Concorde's ageing technology. (The British and French governments were not willing to pay for Concorde 2.0, and the airlines could never afford to pay for the 1.0 version themselves anyway.)

In the case of TSR-2, the UK government cancelled it because they believed the US F-111 was cheaper. They chose to prioritise cost over the interests of their domestic aircraft industry. That may have been a foolishly shortsighted decision, but ultimately fault for it lies with the UK not the US.

> It does require capitulation from weak or compromised leaders in the producing nation. Take France as a counter example of a country that refused to capitulate

My original point was about how differences in culture can potentially lead to differences in economic outcomes. I think differences in culture could also play a role in whether a country's leaders are "weak".