This seems like it depends upon a perspective unavailable at the time.
Until June 1943 (by which point Germany has in fact lost the war though it will fight on for a long while, the Eastern Front campaign is going terribly and the United States is increasingly diverting resources to a "Europe First" strategy which Germany can't conceivably overpower) the only breaks of Lorenz at Bletchley were based on what they called depth. Multiple ciphertexts using the same key, a fatal flaw for a cryptosystem even today.
For example a German radio operator begins encoding and transmitting an important message, and then is interrupted by some matter, after a few minutes they begin again but use the same key because it hasn't been impressed upon them that they absolutely must use a fresh key each time. If they make even a trivial typographical error the two ciphertexts will be different and that's enough to recover the messages.
Only in July 1943 do Bletchley begin actually decrypting any messages for which there is no depth. They do this because they have a (very primitive) electronic codebreaking machine, something that has never before existed. This machine is unsatisfactory in many ways but it's ludicrously faster than manual codebreaking.
So it seems unfair to critique Lorenz based on the fact that a suitably powerful electronic machine can break it. No such machines had ever existed before. Plus it took several years to even conceive of how to do the attack before the machine could be built, because of course programmable computers didn't exist yet.
To avoid confusing readers, one should mention that modern ciphers separate the key, which can be reused but must be kept secret, from the initialization vector (IV), which must not be reused but can be transmitted in the clear.
These correspond roughly to the Enigma's daily settings and per-message rotor start positions, but AIUI the procedure for selecting and transmitting the latter changed over the course of the war, and at times insecure even if done according to the procedure.
Edit: never mind: you'd actually need 28 contacts, since the reflector can only reflect an even number of contacts. With an even number of unused contacts on the input side of the rotor stack, you could connect them together in pairs to get extra passes through the rotor stacks. If they added / (for use as a number shift symbol, so 1123 would be /AABC/ ) to their alphabet, then they could use 28 contacts and have something like described above. However, without modifying the alphabet space to have an odd number of symbols, all other workarounds I can think of require an odd number of used inputs at the one end of the rotor stack and and even number of contacts at the reflector end.
The Germans used Q or Z as their number shift symbol when enciphering digits for Enigma traffic, correct?
In the few random decrypts I looked at (from U-Boat traffic), e.g., https://enigma.hoerenberg.com/index.php?cat=The%20U534%20mes... numbers were spelled out.
The limitation on the number of rotors is key pressure. A 3-rotor Enigma has a huge key travel and you have to push hard. (I've had the opportunity.) The friction between the contacts is high. That's why these machines were not built with enough rotors to be really secure.
The next step up was the Lorenz 10-rotor machine, but that had to be motorized. But the crypto design of that was botched, and it's easy to crack. A real 10-rotor alphabetical Enigma-like machine without a "reflector" would have been secure against any attacks of the period.