sql_query('SELECT * FROM mytable WHERE name = ?', name)
(I'm aware that this defeats the purpose of prepared statements to be reusable - this is just an API that's better than the current methods)A password must:
be 6-8 characters in length.
contain a non-alphanumeric character such as ( ! ] & * , + =
A password cannot:... include a dollar sign ( $ ), a single quote ( ‘ ), a double quote ( “ ), a number sign ( # ), a less-than sign ( < ), a question mark ( ? ), a pipe ( | ), a back quote ( ` ), or a backslash ( \ ). ...
If it was a startup web app I was signing up for, I'd send the developer a polite email saying that I didn't feel comfortable putting my data in such a system. Unfortunately, all I can usually do is gripe a little in private.
Huh? Most web frameworks use ORMs and discourage you from touching SQL at all.
Yes, there might be cases that a very specifically optimized query needs SQL, but those should be the exception not the rule.
† Which are not a cure-all for SQLI.
Side note: We're jumping to conclusions by thinking that the javascript is the entire implementation. It's perfectly possible that the server is already safe against SQL injection and the javascript is just an extra line of defense. Maybe the client and server were done by separate programmers and the client programmer wanted to make sure he wouldn't get blamed. It's a government website: nobody in government ever got fired for being too careful. Or maybe the programmer had to do it to satisfy some non-technical bureaucrat who wanted to think that hacking attempts couldn't even reach his server.
I do not address web stacks directly there, but Python itself will happily let you use prepared statements, it is up to the programmer to take effective steps to prevent SQL Injection.
As for SQL being a "bad API" that might be one of the more ridiculous comments I have heard.
It is indeed unreasonable to expect a junior developer to make form submission secure. Aside from SQL injection there's DoS, MiTM, CSRF, XSS, session fixation, cache poisoning, clickjacking, timing attacks (to detect valid vs invalid values), rainbow table attacks, and many more. Just go through the list of requirements in OWASP ASVS. It's intimidating how much stuff there is to keep track of. We have a dedicated security engineer on our team who reviews all new code, out of necessity.
Also, about SQL being a bad API, I didn't say it was a bad API in general, just bad for the web. SQL is like eval(), it evaluates code from a parsed string. If eval() is bad for the web, SQL is just as bad.
There is no excuse why programming languages should require the programmer to work around the inherent deficiencies of SQL. Just like the x86-64 architecture introduced the no-execute bit to the mainstream computing world and made the rampant buffer overflow remote code execution exploits of the 1990s into an endangered species, we should look to a technological solution to solve SQL's deficiencies.
Why should we need to trust that thousands of CMS module developers all use, know, and understand detainting of input in their native language? If we want to allow reuse of code, we put our absolute trust into thousands of developers other than ourselves.
This is a principal issue. Doing client-side parameter validation for security is a stupid idea in every case. Client-side validation is for user convenience only. This has nothing to do with SQL. Security must be implemented server-side. There are no exceptions to this.
Doing web security well is hard, too hard. Everyone gets caught with a security bug sooner or later, even google. It's easy to laugh with silly coding like this, but I blame the technology for allowing SQL injection in the first place. SQL is simply a bad API to be using in a web app.