This is talking about malware payloads themselves. I don't agree that those capabilities (taking screenshots, especially eval) are trivial in other languages. Eval in particular makes things trivial since you can basically do:
eval(get_payload()), which is awesome from a staging perspective - the trend in malware is to modularize more and more for a number of reasons (less code to scan for sigantures, new monetization strategies, easier to update, etc).
So having the ability to do runtime, reflective module loading to trivially get a capability like screenshotting is pretty huge.
That being said, the security of PyPi and python packaging in general is certainly another interesting topic. I like to think that so far it hasn't been as bad as NPM, but there have been backdoored packages put out onto the internet. It's bound to happen with any public software repo, and with any project that trusts outside contributors without perfect review.
1. Packages tend to be smaller, and the transitive dependency trees of projects corresponding larger. This means there are more single points of failure.
2. More people are using it.
Python, and for that matter most language package ecosystems, have the same problems as js, but many of them have gotten away with it for a bit longer due to (lack of) scale.
The section on eval was a little more interesting but still nothing special.
Personally, and this is just my probably uninformed opinion, the biggest thing about Python that makes it useful for malware is its huge, mostly uncurated repository of libraries and addons that are easy to install and use without ever looking at it. This aspect of Python seems likely the most appealing for would be malware writers. The ease of making malicious code widely available without a lot of scrutiny.