Not to mention that this would fix some of the incentive problems. DNS top-levels would effectively be competing on the strength of their certificate-issuing properties - if a particular TLD was known to have a more corruption-resistant registrar, then that TLD ought to become more sought-after by security-concious sites.
This is true, but it is also a problem that needs to be fixed. A CA should not only check whether you control the domain, but should also check your (real-world) identity, and in the case of a company, should also check other documents. Yes, most don't, or do it only ineffectually, but they should do it.
At least with a certificate issued by the registrar, there's some logical reason to believe that it was issued to whoever purchased the domain (whoever that is), which is often enough to establish an encrypted connection at a level the user expects. Significant problems remain, however: 1) Most domain owners have no idea how to generate a key and CSR (the registrar shouldn't do it) and 2) a truly reliable system for certificate revocation must exist to handle domain transfers. These aren't new problems, they just don't go away by shifting to this "easier" approach.
This is just another reason why it's so important to get technologies such as DNSSEC and DNSCurve working. As many have pointed out, it make sense to replace X.509 with DNSEC for exactly this reason, so you can verify the SSL certificate by simply doing a secure dns lookup.