Re:Taking over Azure DevOps accounts with one click
by eganist on Wednesday July 01, 2020 @03:32PM
(#23705481)
That bounty is an order of magnitude smaller than it should've been. It's an account takeover defect that most anyone could fall for because of the structure of the payload URL.
[ Parent
| on HN ]
Re:Taking over Azure DevOps accounts with one click
by donmcronald on Thursday July 02, 2020 @05:37AM
(#23711504)
And it’s shocking they’re able to add a DNS zone for a domain they don’t own. That alone is a massive issue for the email phishing potential. The combination is stunning.
From: [email protected]
SPF: pass
DKIM: pass
DMARC: none
“Hi it’s Bob from Project Cascade. We’re giving away Azure credits to anyone who used our trial in 2019 or earlier. Visit project-cascade.visualstudio.com/credits to check if you’re eligible.”
Click.
“Sorry, you’re not eligible.”
I’d fall for that :-(
Re:Taking over Azure DevOps accounts with one click
by gravitas on Thursday July 02, 2020 @07:57AM
(#23712180)
In all the cloud provider DNS services I've used you can add a zone for anything with no verification of ownership. The root cause flaw is the domain owner allowing their registrar data to go stale and let NS point at a shared service where they did not own/host the records.
Re:Taking over Azure DevOps accounts with one click
by chickenpotpie on Wednesday July 01, 2020 @11:48PM
(#23709798)
Probably makes a lot of less than ethical security researchers wonder if maybe they should do something else with the knowledge of the vulnerability next time