It's like shooting oneself in the foot before hiking.
Even with that, you are now forcing the terrorists to roll their own encryption. The likelihood of finding an exploit in Mujahadeen Secrets is likely much higher than finding an exploit in Apple Messenger or WhatsApp or something by djb or Moxie, etc. In addition, Mujahadeen is likely having to be side loaded - you won't find it in the App Store. This gives a chance to try to hack a single storage location to have a trojan horse version spread through their network. Finally, it affects recruiting. Basically only someone already comitted will go to the trouble of having Mujahadeen Secrets on their device, whereas a lot more people could be expected to have a common end-to-end messenger on their device. So overall, thinking from a purely law enforcement, anti-terrorist perspective, it would still be better for them to not have e2e in widely used apps, even if the terrorists tried to develop their own app.
To be accurate though that's not exactly true. The sheriff doesn't even need a key to enter your house, he can get a warrant and bust your door down.
This is a town where your house is indestructible and un-enterable without a key.
This isn't about their ability to seize things you have after they get a warrant. It's that they want the ability to seize things you have before they get a warrant, just in case they get one later.
It's like requiring everyone to have video cameras in their house with recordings sent to law enforcement no matter whether they're under suspicion or not, and then claiming that it's fine because they pinky swear not to look at them without a warrant. (Never mind that then you can't prove that they're not cheating, and that it would be the world's largest target for organized crime and foreign powers.)
I agree that their analogy isn’t particularly strong, so I removed that part from my comment.
That requires following due process, the presumption of innocence, and observing the right to privacy. You have to convince a judge, in the context of the existing laws, that a certain individual or group are suspicious enough to call for (specific) further investigation.
Mass surveillance and forcing weak encryption bypass or overturn all that. It's a radically different view when you assume everybody is guilty of something by default and that they have no right to privacy.
> There was once a far away land called Ruritania, and in Ruritania there was a strange phenonmenon -- all the trees that grew in Ruritainia were transparent. Now, in the days when people had lived in mud huts, this had not been a problem, but now high-tech wood technology had been developed, and in the new age of wood, everyone in Ruritania found that their homes were all 100% see through...
> One day, a smart man invented paint -- and if you painted your house, suddenly the police couldn't watch all your actions at will...
> Indignant, the state decided to try to require that all homes have video cameras installed in every nook and cranny. "After all", they said, "with this new development crime could run rampant. Installing video cameras doesn't mean that the police get any new capability -- they are just keeping the old one." [...]
https://cypherpunks.venona.com/date/1993/04/msg00559.html
(I recommend reading the full parable.)
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clock.org homepage (c. 1998)
> Some agencies of the United States Government (notably the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)), want to prevent the deployment of encryption technology. They want either encryption so weak that just about anyone can break it, or they want a copy of every key used with strong encryption.
https://web.archive.org/web/19980113124617/http://www.clock....
Sound familiar?
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Mujahedeen Secrets (first release: 2007), Al-Queda’s own encrypted messaging software. Those developers aren’t going to respond to a US court order.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mujahedeen_Secrets