#2 is being changed.
This is baloney. There are already 2 AOA sensors on the plane, but MCAS originally only read from one of them: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/03/boein...
This is a fundamental design flaw for a system which can have catastrophic consequences. This should have been classified as a DO-178B level A system (capable of crashing the plane) but was misclassified by Boeing. DO-178B level A systems require triple redundancy.
Most pilots and planes were basically sitting idle anyway. It's good for them to remain somewhat active. And fuel was given away for pretty much free because the overproduction was filling up expensive storage space.
This would have been the ideal moment to teach 737 pilots to properly handle the Max aircraft without needing MCAS.
Well, its not legal to have the 737 MAX without MCAS, so its a moot point.
MCAS exists to compensate for undesired control forces as high (near-stall) angles of attack, its not legal to have those performance characteristics in an aircraft.
If this was Airbus, this would have been done in software since the A320 series is fly by wire.
That's just not true. People seem to be conflating the fact that the design required software-controlled stability (e.g. MCAS) as a "fundamental" design issue. That's just not the case. The problems were:
1. MCAS was not sufficiently redundant.
2. Boeing tried to get away with the changes to the MAX without requiring recertification or pilot retraining, which was just wrong.
Both #1 and #2 have straightforward fixes.