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Re:A new theory about political polarization by raz32dust on Monday June 29, 2020 @02:01PM (#23680274)
Disappointed to not see any mention of ranked choice voting. I think the winner takes all system leads to a two-party duopoly and makes it difficult for intermediate positions to win.

P.S: Yes, I know Australia has ranked choice and they also have problems. Of course it's not a panacea, there are other problems like the role of money in politics. But it will be better than what we have today, and should reduce polarization considerably over time IMO.

Re:A new theory about political polarization by mmcconnell1618 on Monday June 29, 2020 @03:52PM (#23681843)
Harvard Business Review podcast had an interesting take on this which suggested that the party-aligned primary system was the main cause. They applied Porter's 5 Forces to politics and suggested ranked choice voting would be one of the main ways to break to duopoly.

https://hbr.org/podcast/2020/06/applying-porters-five-forces...

Re:A new theory about political polarization by raz32dust on Monday June 29, 2020 @04:18PM (#23682247)
It makes sense right? It's so ridiculous to see Biden and Bernie battle it out in "Stage 1", and then only one of them gets to go against Trump. Instead of Biden, Bernie and Trump and everyone else just run together in a race as it should really be. We might have even had a better person on the Republican side in this case.
Re:A new theory about political polarization by birdyrooster on Monday June 29, 2020 @04:26PM (#23682403)
Maybe every four years we switch between FPTP and RC
Re:A new theory about political polarization by tunesmith on Monday June 29, 2020 @04:18PM (#23682267)
Ranked choice voting is always a semi-poisoned subject because of the IRV adherents' insistence on calling IRV "ranked choice voting". Ranked choice voting is preference capturing mechanism that yields very valuable data. IRV is one of many possible counting implementations.
Re:A new theory about political polarization by 13415 on Monday June 29, 2020 @06:24PM (#23684068)
Isn't the problem that although rank-based systems have many desirable properties, they are particularly prone to strategic voting and manipulation? I personally think they are good in cooperative settings where voters have no strong incentive to vote strategically, but are they really so desirable for adversarial situations like national elections?
Re:A new theory about political polarization by scythe on Monday June 29, 2020 @08:33PM (#23685209)
>they are particularly prone to strategic voting and manipulation?

IRV and AV are particularly prone to strategic voting. Amusingly, the best catalog of IRV's failures is generally provided by AV proponents, and the best catalog of AV problems can be found on FairVote.org.

The ranked-choice systems which satisfy a criterion called ISDA -- independence of Smith-dominated alternatives, or more poignantly, independence of losers -- are harder to manipulate. These are all "Condorcet" methods, because ISDA is a generalization of Condorcet.

ISDA means roughly that if a candidate is not in contention to win (the "Smith set"), it doesn't matter where they appear on your ballot. I could rank Vermin Supreme and Ron Paul #1 and #2 and the algorithm basically cancels it out and starts me at #3. The reason that ISDA is so effective at preventing strategic voting is that in order to vote strategically, I have to misrank a candidate who might actually win; in other words, I must accept a realistic risk of encouraging an outcome I don't really want. That's a pretty good disincentive, in my opinion.

However, the worry about strategic voting seems to be at least a little overblown. Australia does deal with "how-to-vote" cards[1], but this is a way to prevent "allied" parties from accidentally competing with each other. In 2009, there was concern over a monotonicity violation in Australian elections where supporters of one of the parties were encouraged to misrank another party. However, the voters didn't go along with the plan, and instead voted honestly:

https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/howtovote-cards-...

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-05-04/an-example-of-non-mon...

Re:A new theory about political polarization by tunesmith on Monday June 29, 2020 @08:30PM (#23685193)
I suppose you could extend that all the way back past the practice of voting... ultimately democratic voting isn't as good as some kind of scalable deliberative consensus mechanism that educates people, but we don't have one of those. But anyway, there's also a lot of misinformation out there about voting methods. For instance, most sources say that all Condorcet methods are flawed, but that's because they conflate Condorcet counting with the various tie-breaking methods when there are cycles. The latter can be flawed, but the former is not. If there's a Condorcet winner, it doesn't run afoul of Arrow's theorem or anything. The main "flaw" with a Condorcet winner is that you can have a Condorcet winner without that candidate having "majority approval", depending on how you measure "approval".
Re:A new theory about political polarization by jlokier on Tuesday June 30, 2020 @12:12AM (#23686472)
I believe it's the other way around.

Good rank-based systems are less prone to strategic voting and manipulation than plurality voting (= an ordinary vote), because each voter can safely put their preferred candidate first, even if that candidate is unlikely to win, without harming the chances of their next-preferred candidate.

They don't need to vote strategically to try to keep someone they particularly dislike out.

The no-so-good rank-based systems are less effective at this separation (though no system can be perfect at it), so people still vote strategically of course. But the pressure to do so is still reduced compared with plurality. Plurality is probably the worst of all options for pressuring people to vote strategically.