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Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by AnthonyMouse on Saturday June 27, 2020 @02:54AM (#23660005)
There are reasons not to use cloud services for backups, not trusting them with your data being a major one. But then you should still be using some kind of internal backup system.

There is no excuse for not having backups.

Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by nindalf on Saturday June 27, 2020 @03:46AM (#23660194)
“No, we can’t use leading cloud providers to store this data. What if someone unauthorised looks at it?”

This attitude leaves the victim paying millions in ransom. Look, Microsoft and Amazon probably have a better handle on security than your IT dept which is two people who also have to fix any issues like the WiFi not working or software not updating.

Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by vinay_ys on Saturday June 27, 2020 @11:27AM (#23662413)
There is no reason to believe clouds don't have security issues or software bugs that cause inadvertent data loss.

Just because the cloud provider is a big company doesn't mean the security is better. At the end of the day, they are a team of software engineers with all the usual people and org problems and can have usual human mistakes.

But cloud solutions are better in practice due to totally non-technical reasons. Here's how -

If UCSF can afford to pay millions in ransom, they can definitely afford to hire the right experts to do their IT systems properly.

It is likely that they hire the right people, but then the most commonly recommended security policies were considered but not implemented due to resistence from powerful non-security team members inside the organization. (Usually, the highly paid CISO is playing politics with peers to keep the job by ignoring those security experts).

If it also possible that the IT+security team is incompetent and is only good for deploying expensive but useless vendor solutions that do a lot of security theater but do very little to improve actual security. Also possible that the vendor solutions are susceptible to be misconfigured easily to become insecure.

Public cloud solutions can help overcome these above shortcomings of in-house security+IT teams in a org politics friendly manner.

Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by AnthonyMouse on Saturday June 27, 2020 @12:51PM (#23662914)
> Public cloud solutions can help overcome these above shortcomings of in-house security+IT teams in a org politics friendly manner.

The problem there being that the choice of "public cloud" is subject to all the same forces, so then the vendor with the best corporate marketing team gets the business even if their security is crap.

Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by bpfrh on Saturday June 27, 2020 @04:20AM (#23660326)
There are stories of MSPs who got their offline backup from the same provider who they bought their cloud based RMM tool.

One day an account get's exploited and suddenly the backups are deleted and the systems are all encrypted remotely.

Cloud backups are not offline backups, if you want security use tapes or remote systems which turn on manually.

Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by nindalf on Saturday June 27, 2020 @05:24AM (#23660557)
A backup that can be overwritten is not a backup.

It is possible to use a cloud provider and also write an immutable backup.

Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by AnthonyMouse on Saturday June 27, 2020 @05:45AM (#23660661)
> This attitude leaves the victim paying millions in ransom.

Not if they still have backups that aren't cloud backups.

> Look, Microsoft and Amazon probably have a better handle on security than your IT dept which is two people who also have to fix any issues like the WiFi not working or software not updating.

And that's part of the problem, right? Your IT department isn't too bright, so they encrypt their cloud backups with a tool that does the encryption wrong, and the smarter engineers at the cloud provider know that it's vulnerable so now they can read your data when you thought they couldn't. Or you use a weak password for the cloud backup account and then some third party breaks in and gets them.

Not really a concern with a backup tape stored in a fire safe.

Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by throw0101a on Saturday June 27, 2020 @08:03AM (#23661267)
> […] not trusting them with your data being a major one.

Which is why you encrypt the data before sending it over the wire. Just like how you'd use encryption on LTO tapes before sending them offsite.

Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by jtokoph on Saturday June 27, 2020 @03:13AM (#23660067)
If you don’t trust them with your data, you can encrypt it with your own keys.
Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by briffle on Saturday June 27, 2020 @04:19AM (#23660318)
Really, someone just did that for them, for the bargain price of $1.4M. I'm guessing they saved at least that much by outsourcing their entire IT department a few years ago.
Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by znpy on Saturday June 27, 2020 @11:02AM (#23662250)
This is really the best possible answer. you just did the root cause analysis for them too (you should send them an invoice).

Nothing new, in a way: cut the spending on IT, lower quality, get incidents.

Meh.

Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by AnthonyMouse on Saturday June 27, 2020 @05:29AM (#23660580)
But then you lose the main advantages of using them to begin with. It becomes harder to use, it may not be able to do efficient differential backups or snapshots anymore or require you to do some complicated thing to make it work because their interface isn't meant to be used that way etc. And if it's actually important for the data to remain private, you then have to get the cryptography right, not think that your backups are "encrypted" because you used TLS, or use some snake oil encryption software which is using export ciphers or bad random number generation or anything like that.

In-house backups aren't that hard. The hardest thing is to make sure everything is getting backed up that ought to be, and actually test that it is, which is no different with cloud backups.

Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by throw0101a on Saturday June 27, 2020 @08:15AM (#23661319)
> But then you lose the main advantages of using them to begin with.

Poppycock. There's plenty of software that can do encrypted incrementals / differentials: Commvault, NetBackup, Veeam, tarsnap, Duplicity, ZFS snapshot send-recv,

Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by AnthonyMouse on Saturday June 27, 2020 @12:48PM (#23662891)
You're asserting that these things are as easy to use as keeping all your junk on a shared Google Drive or whatever it is many companies are currently doing?

They all require you to have a level of technical competence equivalent to what would be needed to implement the backups yourself.

Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by throw0101a on Saturday June 27, 2020 @01:24PM (#23663125)
If you're talking about something that is worth paying US$ 1M in ransom, then paying someone a few (tens of) thousands in cost centre chargebacks upfront, and probably an ongoing annual fee, is cheap insurance if you want to go with the 'enterprise software'.

And if you want 'consumer software' that offers cloud / offsite encrypted back, then Backblaze offers it in a very clicky-clicky fashion that most folks can handle with a bit of hand-holding:

* https://help.backblaze.com/hc/en-us/articles/217664688-Can-y...

As does Arq, with a documented file format:

* https://www.arqbackup.com/arq_data_format.txt

Every cloud-capable backup system (for consumers and enterprises) does encryption nowadays, so talking about 'data access' in the cloud is a straw man.

Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by justinclift on Saturday June 27, 2020 @02:30PM (#23663634)
If you really want to include NetBackup in that list, then for a real world deployment you'll generally be looking at more than US$1M+.

Assuming it's for an actual enterprise or at least large dept.

Source: Used to be a NetBackup engineer on enterprise accounts :)

Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by throw0101a on Saturday June 27, 2020 @09:19PM (#23666058)
I've included more and less cost options in the list to counter the very argument that you seem to be attempting to make.

How much productivity was lost from many dozens of people not being able to work because of lack of access, the IT resources that had to be extended to investigate the various options, and then the US$ 1M ransom eventually paid out.

For Want of a Nail:

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/For_Want_of_a_Nail

Re:Update on IT Security Incident at UCSF by znpy on Saturday June 27, 2020 @11:03AM (#23662256)
eh, there's no free lunch.