Sounds like we largely agree, then. :)

I'm not ready to say I think this should or shouldn't be allowed and under what circumstances, because I'm not a lawyer or legal scholar. It just bugs me when people post these reductive black-and-white takes without even seeming to consider how complicated these issues really are. If it was so simple, that document would be a lot shorter, I think.

I'd argue there should be a line somewhere. There's cases where the authorities may have reason to believe that something is not protected attourney-client communication and intercept it, but at the same time they should not be allowed to just intercept anything because it could be evidence disguised as communication.

Yeah. I'd compare this to the fifth amendment issues around providing a password to a computer, safe, etc., where (IIRC) compelling a defendant to provide the password is contingent on having strong arguments to the effect that they own the device in question, that they have the password, and most importantly that the contents of the device are essentially a foregone conclusion.

That same "foregone conclusion" doctrine should apply here too. IMO (but IANAL) the court's argument here could be easily applied to interception/seizure of any communications between client and attorney, which is absurd.

edit: I guess by "the court's argument" I mean the mostly-implicit notion that "filter teams" are a sufficient mechanism to obviate any concerns over the government intercepting privileged communications. Most of what I read seemed to be an implicitly (again with the implicitude!) ex post facto justification of seizing the package based on the fact that it did contain non-privileged materials, and said materials would have been subject to discovery anyway.