To go through your arguments in order:
Increasing the effort to attack is meaningful if it reduces aggregate harm in excess of the cost of implementation. In the specific case of the NotPetya attack on Maersk and generalized to similar attacks, there is no evidence that any of the proposed measures would meaningfully reduce the probability or raise the cost to be other than extremely profitable (this is my statement that $30M cost of attack is profitable). This is because the benefit of attack is so high relative to the cost of exploit development and deployment. So, in the specific case of techniques designed to prevent large, valuable attacks, it has no significant impact since you would need to raise the cost of such an attack to around the benefit of doing such an attack.
Reducing the damage they can do would be useful. The damage done in the Maersk attack occurred over the course of a few hours at most. Any defense against such a technique would need to already be prepared or completely automated. From my reading, damage mitigation usually occurs far after and mostly only prevents the marginal long tail, so I will contend, as in my previous post, that an organization with $30M in funding would be able to do the same amount of damage to any system given that they have the element of surprise and reconnaissance.
Making yourself a less attractive target is only meaningful if nobody wants to attack in you particular, it is not easy to wantonly attack all vulnerable parties, and the attacker does not have enough resources after attacking all even more profitable targets before attacking you since, as we stated before, it is still very beneficial to attack you. For the first, that is a bad bet when running a large-scale multinational. For the second, that is literally what software is good at, mass synchronized automated attacks. NotPetya is literally an example of a wanton attack. It is mentioned in that article that Maersk was not even the target. They were accidentally attacked for $250M in damages. Being a less attractive target means nothing if somebody has a weapon that hits all attractive targets at the same time for no extra effort. And for the third, that is a terrible bet in the long run because profitable targets means they have money after each attack, so they will have money to spare to go after you. The only comfort is that it may take them time to hockey-stick to the point where they can saturate the market, but saturate they will. We are already seeing this with the increase in attacks with meaningful economic upside for the attacking parties instead of cheesy little $200/computer attacks.
Not deploying vulnerable systems is always an option, it just depends on the cost-benefit analysis as you state. My thesis is that the cost of vulnerable systems is, in the long run, significantly worse than almost all companies realize and there is no effective solution. My justification for this is that I am firmly of the belief, as my questions above indicate, that there is no company that can defend against a $30M attack and that a $30M attack can easily and credibly cause $300M in damages, and, even assuming good-faith extortion so they do not just extort for more money with the same attack, there are enough more $30M attacks that can cause $300M in damages that any such company will go bankrupt either from paying the extortion or from the extortion following through on their threats.
As a thought-experiment to go with this, if Maersk offered a $30M bounty for each unique vulnerability discovered that could cause them over $300M in damages, do you think they would run out of such bugs first or go bankrupt first? If the answer is "bugs first", why do they not offer such a bounty since each such vulnerability discovered is at least a 10:1 ROI for criminals and thus would be highly attractive to discover?
Just to get ahead of a common response to the above thought experiment corollary. Some people will respond that companies do not need to offer that much to get such vulnerabilities reported to them. This indicates that the problem is even worse than I stated since the cost of discovery is lower which means the criminal ROI is even higher. If they offered $30M for all such vulnerabilities they would be more likely to remove the highly attractive 10+:1 ROI attacks that can do tremendous amounts of damage to them which is a great ROI for the company.
The whole point of InfoSec is to find the right balance of investment into preventive measures and incident response teams so that the cost/risk/reward ratios of an attack make it non viable for economically motivated attacker.
To this end, I will clarify what I meant.
I believe that an attack funded on the order of $30M would be able to do $300M in damages to Maersk even if Maersk adopted best-in-class preventative measures and implemented them as a primary focus with support from management at all levels. An attack, able to do $300M in damages that Maersk can not prevent after we have assumed it already did the best it possibly can, should be able to support a $100M extortion payment. This is an ROI of 3 for an attacker with high threshold and an ROI of 3 for Maersk, so I think this is a valid assessment.
So, a counterargument/example is an organization where an attack funded on the order of $30M can not impact operations by more than 1%. I chose the number of 1% because Maersk has a revenue of $39B, so a $300M attack is only ~1% reduction in company output. I hope this clarifies my statement.
I also stated in a different response that I believe that the number of $30M attacks that could do $300M in damages probably exceeds Maersk's profit if they paid for all of them at $30M, let alone paying extortion at $100M or having the attack follow through at the cost of $300M. Therefore, in the long run the potential market size is enough to destroy Maersk.
As a mildly related note, if anybody here is a member of the infosec community I have a question:
How much do you think it would cost for a targeted attack to breach and cause significant damage to the best system you have every personally observed? How did you verify that number? Three pentests by three different competent companies paid that amount and that found no vulnerabilities of note would be convincing. I would likely find other things on that general level convincing, but I can not declare them off-hand.
FAANGs are bigger targets and yet none of them suffered anything remotely similar.
> An attack, able to do $300M in damages that Maersk can not prevent after we have assumed it already did the best it possibly can, should be able to support a $100M extortion payment.
That's incorrect. I already mentioned it in another reply, but in short it does not matter that attack caused 300M in damages. What matters is how much Maersk could possibly save by paying out ransom. And that's a fraction of those 300M not even including secondary effects such as potential problems with tax office, reputational damage or having to deal with becoming a target #1 for every other ransomware crew out there - as they just proved that they are ok with paying out for such "unsolicited penetration tests". It also misses that even if Maersk payed out 100M, criminals wouldn't have any way to actually benefit from all of that, as laundering such amount of BTC isn't trivial and historically that's exactly the step with highest risk for the criminals.
> How much do you think it would cost for a targeted attack to breach and cause significant damage to the best system you have every personally observed?
That's a non-answerable question as it does not mention other resources that are available to attacker besides pew-pew internet weapons, restrictions that they potentially face, the risk they are comfortable with, and basically all of these questions applied to the defensive side as well (i.e. on a furthest side of the spectrum there are certain systems, attacking which would put you above ISIS leaders on a to-be-droned-soon list).
That's a simplification beyond any usefulness. You wouldn't be able to do as much damage with $100k budget in a few months as a well-staffed national agency in a week.
> The question is just me looking for broad strokes anecdotes.
Even Jeff Bezos wouldn't be able to orchestrate a cyberattack that crashes International Space Station with astronauts aboard.
To illustrate:
How much damage could somebody do with a $100K budget in a few months to the best system you have been personally involved in?
How much damage could a well-staffed national agency do in a week to that system?
For all credible adversaries that could cause $X in damage, choose the 20th percentile cost adversary, how much would that cost?
The question is also specifically limited to systems the answerer has worked on to avoid speculation on practices or "grass is always greener" mentality. Did you work on the ISS on software or software security?
Jeff Bezos has over $100B. Therefore, I take your answer to mean:
With $100B nobody could orchestrate an cyberattack that could crash the ISS?
The cost to develop the Stuxnet attack has been estimated to be $1M according to former director of the NSA General Hayden. This is likely an underestimate only accounting for the cost of the exploit itself. Kaspersky Lab claims it cost in the regime of $100M to develop and deploy. So, lets take the high number and multiple it by 10 leaving the cost of disabling the secret air-gapped Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program at $1B. Do you think the cost of a critical attack against the ISS is 100x higher than a critical attack on the Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program?
Please avoid limiting your imagination to just direct attack on the ISS itself. There are multiple entities which when attacked would likely be able to de-orbit the ISS and kill all the astronauts. Please verify that none of these could occur for less than $100B: taking over a rocket to the ISS, taking over a rocket to LEO, active satellites in the correct orbital plane, decommissioned satellites that are no longer tracked but with enough fuel to intercept, scientist laptops that connect to the ISS network, over-drawing the laptop batteries so they blow up while in the ISS, etc. This also ignores more clever tactics you could do with $100B such as buy a company directly supplying critical needs of the ISS and then insert backdoors into the software.
That is not how these attacks happen, that is not what happened at Maersk, and that is not what the article is about.
The breach happend via compromised third-party software installed on a small number of regular workplace PCs. The big damages happened largely because sloppy privilege managment allowed the attackers to hop between systems and gradually acquire more credentials and more privileges via weak or reused passwords and accounts shared across systems and functions, until the attackers controlled thousands of PCs and servers across the entire international company.
This kind of thing is a process, and the amount of damages depends mostly on how fast the attackers can gain more privileges vs. how soon they are noticed and countermeasures taken.
Better privilege management, as suggested by the article, can easily slow down that process to a point where it won't cause significant damage.
And your whole extortion argument hinges on the idea that an attacker can demonstrate the ability to cause X amount of damage without actually doing it or giving the victim information that can be used to prevent the attack. That is not how it works in reality, except in the case of DDOS attacks, which are an infrastructure rather than a security issue.
In reality, the amount of damage an extortionist hacker can put a price on is only the amount they can undo or provably refrain from doing in the future. Specific examples of this are mass-encrypting data and threatening to publish trade secrets. And those are things we see happening in reality, but the amounts are much smaller because they cannot include the large-scale disruption of operations that Maersk experienced.
By your logic, the form of extortion you describe should already be happening, constantly, to every large company on the planet. It should be the most profitable form of organized crime ever.
But that is not happening in reality. Because in reality, security and security breaches don't work like you seem to think they do.
What is your evidence that better privilege management would prevent an attack funded on the order of $30M from being anything other than devastating? Given that nearly every company in the world is routinely successfully attacked, I see no justification for giving the benefit of the doubt to claims of security that are not rigorously analyzed and tested. Have you ever seen a company run a $30M pentest that did not find ways in? If your answer is that no company does a $30M pentest since that is a crazy amount to pay, that supports my point since they are only bothering to test things easier than the standard I put forward. There is no reason to trust an entity in an industry that claims they are better than can be verified. If your answer is that a $30M pentest is not indicative of anything and nobody tests that way, then please suggest a test that correlates to difficulty of attack that is at the $30M level. If the answer is no such test exists, then I fail to see why there should be any confidence at all in claims that can not even be loosely quantified or correlated against the primary problem.
I will actually claim $30M is far too high. I bet attacks of this caliber would only take ~$1M to develop and deploy against best-in-class defenses. Therefore, my extortion argument actually becomes that they engineer 30 independent attacks and can burn one or two of them to demonstrate that they can do at least $300M in damages. Even developing 30 independent attacks, the strategy is highly profitable under my assumptions.
No, the extortion market is new. There is no reason to suggest that a new greenfield market with a multi-billion dollar potential market should be instantaneously saturated. That is ridiculous. This should be especially true in light of the fact that criminals do not have access to high-growth funding models due to being criminals so are generally required to bootstrap. Just because some criminal act is not done does not mean that it can not be done. Nobody hijacked a plane and flew it into a building before 9/11, but nobody is claiming that it was not feasible beforehand or that it would not have been an efficient act of terror if done previously.
If you actually want to make a meaningful counter-argument that may be convincing, please start from $300M in damages and then back-calculate the necessary cost of attack for a criminal to find such an attack profitable. State assumptions on each step for why it influences cost or benefit in some fashion and then we can discuss if those steps seem reasonable. I already did this previously when back-calculating to $30M from $300M, so you could also discuss why you think the individual steps are invalid. Please try to include quantitative estimates or beliefs. Ranges and probabilities are fine to hedge any statements.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Only ignorant amateurs believe that security is an all-or-nothing game.
By making your system more difficult to break into, you:
* increase the effort and thus cost for the attacker, thereby reducing the number of opponents that can successfully attack you
* reduce the damage they can do before the attack is discovered and stopped
* make yourself a less attractive target compared to others
> Therefore, any company in a similar circumstance should probably not be deploying connected systems that allow this level of attack.
That is simply not an option. You'd increase operating costs far more than the damage caused by this attack, and at the same time lose capabilities that customers have come to expect. Most of the cost of this attack came from having to operate without connected systems.