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Re:WireGuard Merged into OpenBSD by woodruffw on Sunday June 21, 2020 @09:58PM (#23596830)
> I dont think that website is very compelling. It claims a bunch of things as not good practise, and then asserts without evidence or example that openbsd does them.

Here's a material example: OpenBSD has expended considerable effort into removing ROP gadgets from their compilation products[1].

As the website documents[2], these efforts haven't made a single exploit harder to write.

GCC even removed their (mostly equivalent) ROP mitigation approach, documenting it as "fairly ineffective" and "lur[ing] developers to the land of false security"[3].

(Another good example is PID randomization: OpenBSD added this over 20 years ago as part of their "randomize anything that can be randomized" approach. It's never had any real positive security impact, and has made other PID-based vulnerabilities more viable.)

[1]: https://www.openbsd.org/papers/eurobsdcon2018-rop.pdf

[2]: https://isopenbsdsecu.re/mitigations/rop_removal/

[3]: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/gcc/patch/CAFULd4ZL-wa3...

Re:WireGuard Merged into OpenBSD by sanxiyn on Sunday June 21, 2020 @10:29PM (#23596955)
I agree some OpenBSD security mitigations are dubious, but if I am forced to choose between Linux (too little) and OpenBSD (too much), it seems to me OpenBSD is definitely preferrable. (Of course, the best is to implement only effective ones.) Do you disagree?
Re:WireGuard Merged into OpenBSD by woodruffw on Sunday June 21, 2020 @10:52PM (#23597040)
I think that Linux is a security mess in its own ways.

That being said, I think Linux’s guts get far more attention than OpenBSD’s do, and that the (fewer) mitigations that Linux chooses to implement are much better supported by both information on real-world attacks and by the literature. Given that, I have a slight preference for Linux. But that shouldn’t be taken as praise.

Re:WireGuard Merged into OpenBSD by beachhead on Sunday June 21, 2020 @10:20PM (#23596920)
Where are all the OpenBSD exploits that bypass these mitigations? Serious question.
Re:WireGuard Merged into OpenBSD by IcePic on Wednesday June 24, 2020 @04:02AM (#23625368)
at the time, lots and lots of scripts would place things in /tmp/scriptname-$PID so you could race them, since you can know where it will write things, other scripts would use PID for random which is equally bad, especially for things that run from rc scripts at startup, so I would say "nothing was gained" is a bit of a stretch.

After a while, mktemp got more usage (which is good) and $RANDOM became available for scripts and so forth, but the situation was quite bad 20+ years ago as far as vendor installation scripts went.

Perhaps exactly noone was saved on OpenBSD because few installed linux-compat Netscape 1.1N for i386 with a bad installation script while having adversarial users logged in, but there is no reason to be equally bad as the then-more-popular OSes who did see /tmp races being won by users.