That being said, I think Linux’s guts get far more attention than OpenBSD’s do, and that the (fewer) mitigations that Linux chooses to implement are much better supported by both information on real-world attacks and by the literature. Given that, I have a slight preference for Linux. But that shouldn’t be taken as praise.
After a while, mktemp got more usage (which is good) and $RANDOM became available for scripts and so forth, but the situation was quite bad 20+ years ago as far as vendor installation scripts went.
Perhaps exactly noone was saved on OpenBSD because few installed linux-compat Netscape 1.1N for i386 with a bad installation script while having adversarial users logged in, but there is no reason to be equally bad as the then-more-popular OSes who did see /tmp races being won by users.
Here's a material example: OpenBSD has expended considerable effort into removing ROP gadgets from their compilation products[1].
As the website documents[2], these efforts haven't made a single exploit harder to write.
GCC even removed their (mostly equivalent) ROP mitigation approach, documenting it as "fairly ineffective" and "lur[ing] developers to the land of false security"[3].
(Another good example is PID randomization: OpenBSD added this over 20 years ago as part of their "randomize anything that can be randomized" approach. It's never had any real positive security impact, and has made other PID-based vulnerabilities more viable.)
[1]: https://www.openbsd.org/papers/eurobsdcon2018-rop.pdf
[2]: https://isopenbsdsecu.re/mitigations/rop_removal/
[3]: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/gcc/patch/CAFULd4ZL-wa3...