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Re:SCP – Familiar, Simple, Insecure, and Slow by ggm on Friday June 19, 2020 @10:53PM (#23581125)
Re:SCP – Familiar, Simple, Insecure, and Slow by ggm on Saturday June 20, 2020 @12:13AM (#23581595)
The principle point is that if the server is compromised, the ssh tunnel just becomes a mechanism to propagate things. If you say --size-only or --no-delete or whatever, it doesn't acually constrain what happens over the rsync protocol. It just says what you want the other side to know: if the other side is a bad actor, it can send you whatever it likes, and that can include filepaths outside the local constraint you think you scoped it to (the target can be ../../.. specified)
Re:SCP – Familiar, Simple, Insecure, and Slow by kbenson on Saturday June 20, 2020 @12:21AM (#23581631)
Yeah, I was just reading, thanks for sending the link. What I'm at so far, which is that you were able to successfully get a client to write outside of it's expected root location using a 119 line python script as the server, is pretty problematic in itself if not yet fixed/mitigated in some way. :/

Did you event submit these finding as a bug? I would be interested in tracking this if it was accepted. It looks like this note from 3.1.2's release[1] is it, but I'm not sure:

File-list validation in 3.1.2 December 21st, 2015

If you're using a version of rsync older than 3.1.2 as a client and receiving files from an rsync server that you might not fully trust, this version adds extra checking to the file list to prevent the sender from tweaking the paths and/or the transfer requests in a way that could cause a file to be received outside the transfer destination.

1: https://rsync.samba.org/security.html#s3_1_3