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Re:Pgsodium: Modern cryptography for PostgreSQL using libsodium by tialaramex on Saturday June 13, 2020 @04:03PM (#23512248)
> If I gave you an RSA modulus in which you know one factor is chosen from a range of a few trillion primes, the public key could be broken if public.

And so public CAs are obliged to forbid such practices to the extent they're able to detect them. As a result on the whole users who try to use crap moduli get denied.

Go try it, mint yourself an RSA pair such that the public modulus is 11 x n or something easy, and ask Let's Encrypt to issue for that key in a name you own, they'll refuse explaining that your proposed key is crap. Here's a nickel kid go buy yourself a better semi-prime.

In contrast the vast majority of password protected user accounts don't even check Pwned passwords. I can sign up for a lot of stuff literally using Sup3rman as my password.

> The fact that typical user-chosen passwords are iffy secrets doesn't make the hashes secrets as well.

Yes, in practice it does.

> as you say yourself, we'd still hash if the passwords were random strings. Which turns them into non-secrets.

That works on random strings, but it doesn't work on non-random strings.

No amount of processing can magically make the non-random strings be random and so Argon2id("Sup3rman") is going to need to be treated as a secret or else any fool can just try the most popular passwords and reverse it.

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